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NET NEUTRALITY FROM THE GROUND UP
Christopher Witteman*
In the long-running net neutrality debate, a key assumption has
been that broadband and broadband Internet access service are “jurisdictionally interstate.” But are they really? And what does that mean? In
practice, the interstate assumption has meant that important decisions
about broadband law and policy—whether online content delivery will
be akin to the common carrier model of the legacy phone network or the
entertainment model of the cable television industry, for instance—are
made almost exclusively by the federal government.
The “who decides” question took on new immediacy in 2017, when
the Federal Communications Commission gutted federal net neutrality
rules, and then attempted to preempt the states from adopting their own.
Several states nevertheless enacted open network/non-discrimination
laws; two of them (in California and Vermont) were promptly challenged
on preemption grounds.
This article examines the interstate assumption “from the ground
up.” It starts with wires in the ground and radio links to local cell towers,
i.e., “last-mile” infrastructure without which there would be no broadband Internet access. It arrives at the conclusion that “jurisdictionally
interstate” is more of a fictional construct than a factual description, one
that expresses unexamined policy choices more than essential network
attributes. It concludes by reflecting on alternate ways that federal, state,
and local interests might more harmoniously be integrated in light of the
network’s physical presence and the state laws that enable that presence.

* The author is a former staff counsel at the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).
He has litigated, advised, and written about communications issues since the 1980s, and continues
to consult and provide training for the agency and other clients. He wishes to thank his former
colleagues Helen Mickiewicz and Charles Christiansen for their helpful feedback and occasional
disagreement, as well as Tejas Narechania, Erik Stallman, Brad Ramsay, technologists Henning
Schulzrinne, jc claffy, and Tim Pozar, advocates Harold Feld and Tracy Rosenberg, and friend
Judith Ritter for their useful observations and wise counsel, and the editors and staff at Loyola Law
Review for their diligent cite-checking and helpful suggestions. That said, he alone is responsible
for the content herein, including any errors or omissions. He does not in any way speak for the
CPUC.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The long-running battles around net neutrality—the principle
of non-discrimination in the delivery of Internet traffic—can seem to
the casual observer like a game. The line of scrimmage moves up and
down the field, one team claims victory at the end of the day, only to
see its triumph reversed when the teams meet again.
That might make for good entertainment, but not for effective
law or policy. It is not healthy when every four to eight years the nation’s approach to its essential communications network changes in
such fundamental ways.1
This article argues that law and policy around broadband access and net neutrality are as unstable as they are because—in addition
to the many millions of dollars expended in lobbying and litigating
these issues—the debate has strayed far from facts on the ground: the
delivery of broadband Internet access over local networks consisting
of wires, poles, conduit, and radio links.
Unmoored from this physical reality, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has classified broadband as “jurisdictionally
interstate,”2 a convenient fiction, which hides the fact that most online
traffic is local. It also obscures the vital role of state and local governments in enabling and regulating last-mile utility infrastructure, including broadband providers’ use of streets, backyard easements, and
public rights-of-way. Without this local infrastructure and access,
there is no broadband Internet access service (BIAS). The FCC’s truncated field of vision affects the constitutionally important question of
whether BIAS is best classified as an intrastate or interstate service.3
1. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Administrative States: Beyond Presidential Administration, 98
TEX. L. REV. 265, 270–77, 281, 323 (2019) (“regulatory whiplash”) (construing Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV 2245, 2246 (2001)); see also Tony Romm, Net Neutrality: A Lobbying Bonanza, POLITICO (Feb. 23, 2015, 5:37 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/net-neutrality-a-lobbying-bonanza-115385 [https://perma.cc/86YF-F8GF]
(describing intense opposition to the FCC’s 2015 proposal to regulate broadband like a public utility, including early fundraising efforts and predicted litigation from the nation’s largest telecom
providers). While the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is classified as an independent
federal agency, it inevitably comes under the sway of the Administration in power, resulting in
radical policy swings when power changes hands. See Bulman-Pozen, supra, at 279–80.
2. See, e.g., Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order,
33 FCC Rcd. 311, 429 para. 199 (2018) [hereinafter RIFO], https://www.fcc.gov/document/fccreleases-restoring-internet-freedom-order [https://perma.cc/4HL4-4FRV].
3. The federal-state preemption conflict is not new, has occurred in other industries, and has
existed in the telecommunications world both before and after its transition from a voice-only to an
all-purpose broadband network. E.g., Jonathan Jacob Nadler, Give Peace A Chance: FCC-State
Relations After California III, 47 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 457, 493 (1995).
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In his book on constitutional factfinding, Dean David Faigman
cracks wise about the frequent lack of empirical evidence in constitutional debate. Facts are “about as welcome as a sales pitch by a zipper
salesman to a group of button manufacturers.”4 From both a constitutional and statutory perspective, the flight into abstractions like “jurisdictionally interstate” impedes the development of rational policy and
law around network neutrality and broadband transport.
Recentering the net neutrality debate on the local access network is a decidedly contrarian endeavor in 2021. The notion that
broadband access and transit are interstate services is well-embedded
and widely accepted as necessary to ensure a cohesive national network. It, in turn, is used as the predicate for federal preemption of state
and local laws and regulations across a wide field of broadband-related
issues.
Preemption of state net neutrality rules moved center stage,
when in 2017 the FCC eliminated all non-discrimination rules relating
to BIAS delivery, in its Restoring Internet Freedom Order (RIFO).5
The FCC went further, prohibiting states from adopting their own neutrality rules, arguing that such state initiatives were precluded by the
established “jurisdictionally interstate” classification of broadband
service.6
In defiance of the federal edict, a number of states passed their
own versions of net neutrality laws, California’s SB 822 and Washington State’s HB 2282 being the most robust.7 California’s efforts
4. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 200-YEAR
STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW xi (2004) (“[I]t is hard to find a constitutional
subject that does not incorporate sundry empirical assumptions that either have been or could be
tested scientifically.”).
5. RIFO, supra note 2.
6. Id. at 426–30, paras. 194–200.
7. See Cecilia Kang, States Push Back After Net Neutrality Repeal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/technology/net-neutrality-states.html [https://perma.
cc/8FAG-6QAP]; see also Danielle Dean, The Debate Over Net Neutrality, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/the-debate-over-net-neutrality.aspx [https://perma.cc/E6W3-UKH8] (providing an
overview of state efforts in response to RIFO, including Washington’s new law prohibiting broadband providers from blocking lawful content and paid prioritization, among other regulations).
The California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act of 2018 was enacted
as S.B. 822, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2018), approved and signed into law on September 30, 2018, and codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3100–3104 (2021) (unless noted otherwise, all
citations are to the 2021 edition of the California Codes, available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/). Bill text, history, and analysis are available at SB-822 Communications: Broadband
Internet Access Service, CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov
/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB822 [https://perma.cc/F2MC-FANV].
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were immediately requited with double-barreled lawsuits by a coalition of Internet Service Providers (or “ISPs,” the large telecommunications and cable carriers offering broadband access) and the U.S. Department of Justice; Vermont’s rather more modest net neutrality bill
also attracted ISP litigation.8 In both cases, the primary allegation was
that the state laws are preempted by a federal “light touch” policy, cemented in place by the “jurisdictionally interstate” rubric.
Although the U.S. dismissed its complaint against California
on February 8, 2021, and the District Court ruled against the ISPs on
February 23, 2021, the question left on the table is whether “jurisdictionally interstate” is an appropriate label for broadband services. This
leads to broader questions of whether and how the law in this area
could be stabilized by a re-look at the local, physical substrate over
which Internet access is actually delivered, and a re-think about how
state and federal interests around BIAS might be better balanced.
Section II of this Article provides a short explanation of what
net neutrality is, how it became so controversial, how certain states
reacted when the federal rules were eliminated, and how two states
then defended their laws in court.9 Section III.A recounts states’
8. Brian Fung, Internet Providers Are Joining Trump’s DOJ in Suing California over Net
Neutrality, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/10/
03/internet-providers-are-joining-trumps-doj-suing-california-over-net-neutrality/ [https://perma.
cc/DNA6-N9VY]; David Shepardson, Internet Provider Groups Sue Vermont over Net Neutrality
Law, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2018, 12:48 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-internet/internet-provider-groups-sue-vermont-over-net-neutrality-law-idUSKCN1MS2ZU [https://perma.cc/
MHS3-34S2].
9. The article takes a particularly close look at the defense of the California net neutrality statute
in the U.S. District Court in Sacramento. United States v. California, No. 2:18-CV-02660 (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 30, 2018) (co-defendants were Governor Newsom and Attorney General Becerra, dismissed prior to hearing); Am. Cable Ass’n. v. Becerra, No. 2:18-CV-02684 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3,
2018). The District Court upheld the statute; the matter is now on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. ACA
Connects v. Bonta, No. 21-15430 (9th Cir., argued Sept. 14, 2021), appeal docketed, sub nom.
ACA Connects v. Becerra, No. 21-15430 (9th Cir., Mar. 11, 2021). As this article was going to
print, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision upholding the statute. ACA Connects v. Bonta, No. 2115430, 2022 WL 260642, at *11 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2022) (common carrier provision in the federal
statute “is a limitation on the FCC’s regulatory authority and does not affect the states’ authority”);
id. at *13 (rejecting field preemption without reference to the FCC’s “jurisdictionally interstate”
construct, finding that the “Communications Act itself reflects a federal scheme that leaves room
for state regulation that may touch on interstate services”). For links to the relevant District Court
pleadings see infra notes 65–67; for a useful selection of pleadings in both the District Court and
Ninth Circuit (including the latter’s January 28, 2022 Opinion), see California Net Neutrality
Cases, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/californias-net-neutrality-cases
[https://perma.cc/WTA3-JMS2].
While this article was being edited for publication, a parallel article appeared which also
takes American Cable Association v. Becerra as the starting point for a more general consideration
of state jurisdiction over broadband. Tejas N. Narechania & Erik Stallman, Internet Federalism, 34
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historic exercise of police power over a range of public safety and welfare issues related to broadband, using California as a case study. Section III.B analyzes the “jurisdictionally interstate” categorization of
broadband access, and the factually questionable “impossibility exception” on which it is based. Dismantling this orthodoxy opens up
new law and policy perspectives, which are described in Section III.D.
Before getting there, however, Section III.C takes a final look at the
physical and economic reality of local and last-mile broadband networks.
Net neutrality rules are a bellwether for other issues related to
broadband access, including public safety, universal service, and competition.10 Indeed, this Article could have been titled “Broadband from
the Ground Up.” The FCC’s recent insistence that BIAS regulation is
exclusively within its jurisdiction, while failing to proactively occupy
that space, left a vacuum that almost commanded states to act.11 Even
during the Obama administration, the FCC had endorsed the “jurisdictionally interstate” BIAS classification, while stopping short of claiming exclusivity.12
The unsettled taxonomy has encouraged broadband carriers’
resistance to state authority. Even in matters of public safety, ISPs object that their broadband services are interstate and therefore beyond
the reach of state jurisdiction.13 Such objections, if accepted, put the
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 547, 555 (2021). The papers share an emphasis on the local access network
and state jurisdiction, while offering different perspectives and particulars. Id. at 559.
“Broadband” is commonly understood to be electronic transport over “any circuit significantly faster than a dial-up phone line.” HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY 177
(24th ed. 2008). Currently, the FCC benchmarks broadband speeds at “25 megabits per second
(Mbps) for downloads and 3 Mbps for uploads.” 2015 Broadband Progress Report, FED.
COMMC’NS COMM’N. (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/broadbandprogress-reports/2015-broadband-progress-report [https://perma.cc/4VGQ-DSGX].
10. See Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Net Neutrality Repeal Rips Holes in the Public Safety Net,
80 U. PITT. L. REV. 953, 958 (2019) (“Enforceable rules that prohibited ISPs from blocking, throttling, or engaging in paid prioritization encouraged our [CPUC] decisions to authorize Internetenabled investments by energy and water ratepayers.” (alteration in original)).
11. See generally RIFO, supra note 2, at 541 (Clyburn, Comm’r, dissenting) (reacting to the
FCC’s evisceration of neutrality rules and insistence on federal preemption with the expectation
that states and localities will move into the vacuum—“when the FCC has refused to act in the past,
states and localities often move on their own”).
12. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory
Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5722 para. 278, 5803 para. 431 & n.1276 (2015) [hereinafter
Open Internet Order].
13. When the CPUC required backup power at cell sites in high fire threat areas, AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and other carriers objected, citing RIFO: “The FCC has determined . . . that broadband is an interstate information service. . . . [O]bligations to provide services at particular times
and of particular service levels specified by the Commission are classic forms of common carriage
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states’ primary communications networks at risk when they are
needed most. As service quality declines, prices for this essential service rise and access remains inequitably distributed.14 The immediate
question is what the states can do in this definitional quagmire. The
long-term problem is developing a sustainable and balanced regulatory approach to the electronic network that is ever more central in our
lives.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What Is Net Neutrality?
In lay terms, net (or network) neutrality “is the principle that
the company that connects you to the internet does not get to control
what you do on the internet.”15 This means that individuals and businesses “should be free to access all content and applications equally,
regardless of the source, without [ISPs] discriminating against specific

and public utility regulation that are incompatible with the FCC’s classification . . . .” Application
of CTIA, AT&T Mobility, Cellco Partnership and T-Mobile for Rehearing of Decision 20-07-011,
Rulemaking 18-03-011, at 19 (filed Aug. 19, 2020) [hereinafter Application for Rehearing],
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M345/K151/345151556.PDF [https://perma
.cc/UXH9-3R54]. When the CPUC proposed similar backup requirements for landline remote terminals, AT&T responded in kind. AT&T’s Opening Comments, at 3, Order Instituting Rulemaking
Regarding Emergency Disaster Relief Program, Rulemaking 18-03-011 (filed Aug. 12, 2020)
[hereinafter AT&T’s Opening Comments], https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/
M345/K150/345150228.PDF [https://perma.cc/3WKN-89BS] (“It would unlawfully impose state
regulation on broadband service, a well-established interstate information service.”). When the
CPUC sought to address digital divide issues in the Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding
Broadband Infrastructure Deployment and to Support Service Providers in the State of California,
Rulemaking 20-09-001, slip op. at 8–11, (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 18, 2020),
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M347/K278/347278341.PDF [https://per
ma.cc/4T5A-7N6E], the carriers again objected. E.g., Comments of Comcast Phone of Cal., LLC,
at 18, Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Broadband Infrastructure Deployment and to Support Service Providers in the State of California, Rulemaking 20-09-001 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Oct. 12, 2020), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M348/K579/348579845.PDF
[https://perma.cc/SLZ2-JDPJ] (Governor’s “Executive Order does not (and cannot) grant the Commission any new regulatory authority . . . . [T]he FCC has classified broadband as an interstate
information service subject to a federal policy of non-regulation . . . .”); see also Cox Cable, Frontier, and AT&T Comments in this docket (same).
14. See infra notes 221–223 and accompanying text (discussing declining service quality); see
also discussion infra Sections III.C.2.b–.c, III.C.4.b (discussing lack of competition and digital
divide issues).
15. Net Neutrality, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, https://perma.cc/S47N-39PH. For an excellent introduction to both sides of the net neutrality debate, see Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the
Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 575 (2007),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=953989.
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online services or websites,”16 including “content, applications, and
services that are provided by unaffiliated third parties.”17 The concept
has global ramifications, being “the principle that every point on the
network can connect to any other point on the network.”18
Such non-discrimination principles have been understood as
an extension of centuries-old common carrier obligations originating
with ferries, grain elevators, railroads, and other essential businesses19
“affected with a public interest” and tending toward monopoly.20 The
D.C. Circuit found that the FCC had initially treated broadband as
such a service,21 and that anti-discrimination rules were de jure common carrier regulations (only permissible if the FCC forthrightly declared BIAS to be a telecommunications service).22
16. PUB. KNOWLEDGE, supra note 15. California’s S.B. 822 does not contain a definition of
network neutrality per se, although its prohibitions (on blocking, impairing, or degrading Internet
traffic, requiring edge providers to pay extra to reach consumers, etc.) may be said to constitute a
definition of sorts. California’s Opposition brief offers this definition: “[I]nternet openness—commonly known as net neutrality—[is] the principle that broadband providers must treat all internet
traffic the same regardless of source.” Defendants’ Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motions
at 3, United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-02660 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 16, 2020) [hereinafter California Opposition], https://oag.ca.gov/sites/default/files/%5B27%5D%20Opp%20to%20Mot%20for
%20Prelim%20Inj.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZ9B-XPFD].
17. Open Internet Order, supra note 12, at 5755. The conduit or transport functions at the
heart of net neutrality should not be conflated with the content moderation issues on private online
platforms. Conduit issues are rooted in physical network realities while platform content disputes
are more often a function of social mores and digital rights management, although there are hybrid
cases where the platform owner also owns transport facilities. See GOOGLE FIBER, https://fiber.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/YNU2-3NRZ]; Global Infrastructure, AMAZON WEB SERVS.,
https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/global-infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/CU9T-W5XR]; see
generally infra note 225 (content/transport cross-ownership).
18. KIRSTEN FIEDLER & JOE MCNAMEE, NET NEUTRALITY 2 (2013), https://edri.org/files/paper08_netneutrality.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PLZ-VUBZ].
19. Verizon v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 740 F.3d 623, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he principles of the common law applicable to common carriers . . . demanded little more than that they
should carry for all persons who applied, in the order in which the goods were delivered at the
particular station, and that their charges for transportation should be reasonable.” (quoting Interstate
Com. Comm’n v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 145 U.S. 263, 275 (1892) (omission in original)).
20. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 127–29 (1876) (“[I]f he will take the benefit of that monopoly, he must, as an equivalent, perform the duty attached to it on reasonable terms.”).
21. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 638–39 (noting “Commission’s long history of subjecting to common
carrier regulation the entities that controlled the last-mile facilities over which end users accessed
the Internet” (citing Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd.
24012, 24029–30 para. 35 (1998) [hereinafter Advanced Services Order]). The Communication
Act’s definition of common carrier is circular and not particularly helpful, thus the Verizon Court’s
reliance on pre-Act common law. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2018) (“‘[C]ommon carrier’ . . .
means any person engaged as a common carrier . . . .”), with infra note 62.
22. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 651 (“[T]he basic characteristic that distinguishes common carriers
[is] . . . ‘holding oneself out to serve the public indiscriminately.’”) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n Regul.
Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (NARUC I), 525 F.2d 630, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1976)); see
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An understanding of broadband as common carriage attached
to the “broadband communications grid” from the beginning, described in the 1970s as a “two-way” and primarily “intrastate” network
that offered end-users the ability to “transmit intelligence of their own
design and choosing.”23
Although the Internet is global in scale, its delivery is decidedly local: copper, coaxial and fiber cables, or radio (cell) transmission
bringing broadband over the last mile into the home or business.24
Economic realities dictated that this capital-intensive local grid would
tend toward monopoly. Control of these last-mile facilities, often referred to as the “physical layer” of Internet access,25 puts the ISP in a
position to manipulate consumers’ access to Internet content and

also NANOG, Open Internet Order, YOUTUBE (June 2, 2015), https://youtu.be/KKAa3HgbVyI
[https://perma.cc/PL6K-N75N] (the author describes the history of telecommunications common
carriage in his talk “A Regulator’s Read of the FCC’s Open Internet Order, and Related Regulatory
Proceedings”); San Diego Supercomputer Center, The Death of Common Carriage, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=shK7jasyeow [https://perma.cc/DJ2H-L3WB]
(common carriage as protection of consumers from carrier/ISP interference).
This article uses the terms “carrier” and “ISP” interchangeably, as ISPs in the context of
the current net neutrality debate are simply last-mile carriers; similarly, backbone, transport and
transit providers may all also be considered carriers, inasmuch as they transmit “information of the
user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received.”
See 47 U.S.C. § 153(50)–(51); see also infra note 173 and accompanying text (relating to the changing and sometimes ambiguous use of the term ISP).
23. Nat’l Ass’n Regul. Util. Comm’rs v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601,
606, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting FCC regulation that required cable companies to develop “twoway communications capability” while purporting to preempt state and local government oversight
of same). The court found this two-way service to be a form of common carriage and primarily the
states’ domain.
24. Joint Comments of Internet Engineers, Pioneers, and Technologists on the Technical
Flaws in the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rule-making and the Need for the Light-Touch, BrightLine Rules from the Open Internet Order, Restoring Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108, at
3, 7 (filed July 17, 2017) [hereinafter Joint Technologists’ Comments], https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file
/1071761547058/Dkt.%2017-108%20Joint%20Comments%20of%20Internet%20Engineers%2C
%20Pioneers%2C%20and%20Technologists%202017.07.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWL4-JJDS].
25. Id. at 7 (“[T]he ‘physical layer’ is responsible for physically transmitting and receiving
bits. It can do so over fiber optic cable, copper telephone lines, radio signals, etc., as long as it
provides a way for the layer above it to access the ‘transmit and receive bits’ function.”). While
“physical layer” in engineer’s parlance refers specifically to the data bits travelling over the wire
or radio interface, as used herein it refers primarily to the physical media themselves (wires and
radio waves) and the structures that support such transmission media (poles, conduit, and cellular
antennae). See also infra discussion in Sections III.B.3 (“end-to-end” issues) and III.C.1 (“lower
layer control”). The physical media are predominantly local. Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism,
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795, 797 (2012) (“Local broadband providers’ network management practices,
the grounded towers that loom over neighborhoods, and the cables that run under city streets determine the quality of users’ Internet experiences.”); Narechania & Stallman, supra note 9, at 548 (the
Internet is not a “cloud, floating off into cyberspace”).
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services.26 ISPs have availed themselves of this gateway control
through various blocking, filtering, and priority schemes.27
The consumer or small business owner has little meaningful
choice among broadband providers, and the content or service provider typically has no other way to reach the consumer.28 It is in part
a competition and antitrust problem. Every consumer or business
email, 911 call, or Amazon order—as well as the sophisticated interactions required by energy demand-response software, just-in-time

26. This is not to denigrate the importance of upstream discrimination/interconnection issues,
which are addressed in SB 822. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3101(a)(3), (a)(9) (2021) (addressing ISP
demands for extra compensation from edge providers, and related interconnection issues). The Netflix/Comcast interconnection dispute discussed below is illustrative, and can be seen as a byproduct
of the ISP’s (Comcast’s, in this instance) last-mile terminating access monopoly. Infra notes 227–
228; see also infra notes 223–224 (emphasizing the exclusivity of last-mile BIAS providers over
subscribers’ internet access); “Beyond Frustrated”: The Sweeping Consumer Harms as a Result of
ISP Disputes, OPEN TECH. INST. (Nov. 2014), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10221539522488/OTI
%20Beyond%20Frustrated%20Interconnection%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW7N-UJXC]
(highlighting the consumer and business costs of inter-carrier/ISP disputes). Discrimination issues
can also occur further upstream, for instance between backbone providers. See Narechania & Stallman, supra note 9, at 567–70.
27. Declaration of Scott Jordan in Support of Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motions at
paras. 6–10, 13, 46–47, United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-02660 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 16, 2020)
[hereinafter Jordan Declaration]. Mr. Jordan’s Declaration is one of twelve filed by defendant California on September 16, 2020, in opposition to plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunction. In
the aggregate, they provide a detailed picture of how Internet connectivity is used today and how
non-neutral carrier practices threaten that connectivity. See, e.g., Declaration of Angie Kronenberg
in Support of Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motions, United States v. California, No. 2:18cv-02660 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020) (addressing the ISPs’ “terminating access monopoly” and
other interconnection and traffic delivery issues); Declaration of Andrew McCollum in Support of
Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motions, United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-02660
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020) (describing the challenges of a small independent streaming content
provider); Declaration of Fire Chief Anthony Bowden in Support of Opposition to Preliminary
Injunction Motions, United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-02660 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020) (detailing Verizon’s throttling of the fire department’s internet access during fire emergencies); Declaration of Laura Blum-Smith in Support of Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motions, United
States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-02660 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020) (describing the competitive disadvantages of small carrier/ISPs); Declaration of Thomas Nakatani in Support of Opposition to
Preliminary Injunction Motions, United States v. California No. 2:18-cv-02660 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16,
2020) (describing threat to his alarm services company posed by ISP/carrier interference); Declaration of Dave Schaeffer in Support of Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motions, United States
v. California, No. 2:18-cv-02660 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020) (detailing demands of large ISPs for
payment to deliver content requested by end users); Declaration of Margaret Dolgenos in Support
of Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motions, United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-02660
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2020) (explaining the leverage of large ISPs generally) [hereinafter individually and as State’s Opposition Declarations, available at https://media-alliance.org/2021/01/netneutrality/ [https://perma.cc/3M2E-5FSL]].
28. See discussion infra Section III.C.2.
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production, or remote video monitoring of fire-prone hillsides—necessarily goes over and relies on this connection.29
Common carriage is a hallmark of public utility service, with
its attendant consumer protections. Former FCC advisor Gigi Sohn
and others have emphasized that common carrier designation has ramifications in many related areas, from competition and affordability to
privacy and consumer protections.30
B. How Did We Get Here?
As discussed above, common carriage was the norm in telecommunications regulation both before and after the 1996 Telecommunications Act amendments to the Communications Act of 1934.
The 1996 Act addressed the relationship between the then-burgeoning
data processing services (“information services”) and the underlying
electronic transport (“telecommunications service”); these are addressed in Title I and Title II respectively, with Title II containing the
telecommunications common carriage provisions.31
29. S.B. 822, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(a)(2) (Cal. 2018) (“Almost every sector of California’s economy, democracy, and society is dependent on the open and neutral Internet that supports vital functions regulated under the police power of the state.”). Within the scope of its protection, the bill recognizes police and emergency services, health services, utility services and
infrastructure, transportation infrastructure, educational access, business operations, and other sectors. See also Jonathan Sallet, The Creation of Value: The Value Circle and Evolving Market Structures, 11 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 185, 193 (2013) (“‘Lean manufacturing’ and ‘just
in time’ inventory improved the efficiency of production. . . . [T]he arrival of mass computing and
the Internet introduced powerful new tools for efficiency.”).
30. Gigi B. Sohn, A Policy Framework for an Open Internet Ecosystem, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV.
335, 349–57 (2018). Also included in the bundle of Title II protections are service quality and
resiliency standards necessary for public safety. See discussion infra Section III.A.3; cf. Christopher Witteman, Information Freedom, a Constitutional Value for the 21st Century, 36 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 145, 233–43, 251 (2012) (finding a “positive” right to information access in First Amendment’s free speech principles, which access would be ensured under common
carrier principles).
31. Title 47 of the U.S. Code is dedicated as a whole to “Telecommunications,” although only
a small portion of it addresses “telecommunications” as used in the net neutrality debate (where
“telecommunications” means “common carriage” and “information services” does not). See 47
U.S.C. §§ 151–624 (2018) (labelled “Wire or Radio Communication”), particularly Subchapters I
and II. “Title I” is understood to refer to the more general provisions for “information services,”
while “Title II” contains the specific common carriage provisions applicable to telecommunications
carriers.
That said,Title I (47 U.S.C. §§ 151–161) contains three provisions critical to the interpretation of Title II: (i) statement of purpose in section 151 (“to make available . . . without discrimination . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service . . . for the purpose [inter alia] of promoting safety of life and property . . . .”); (ii) the
separation in section 152 of subject matter jurisdiction into two realms, interstate and intrastate;
and (iii) a series of definitions in section 153, including “common carrier,” “telecommunications,”
“telecommunications service,” and “information service.” Id. at §§ 151–153. Title I does not
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In 2002, the FCC abandoned the status quo ante, deciding that
broadband was no longer a “telecommunications” utility service, and
placing it instead in the lightly or completely unregulated category of
“information service.”32 Accordingly, net neutrality became the issue
it is today.
It was not until early 2015, after a years-long struggle and compilation of a deep factual record, that the Obama FCC corrected the
classification error of the 2002 Order and stated the obvious: BIAS is
(or should be) a transport service that allows subscribers to go where
they will and receive the content of their choice.33 The FCC’s 2015
Open Internet Order adopted a comprehensive set of rules, including
no blocking, no throttling (subject to “reasonable network management”), and no paid prioritization.34

command the FCC to do anything in particular with regard to this universe, except to collect certain
fees and to “forbear” from enforcing sections of Title II when competition provides a market that
is “just and reasonable and . . . not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory,” that protects consumers, and is “consistent with the public interest.” Id. at § 160.
Title II (47 U.S.C. §§ 201–276) contains the substantive elements of common carrier regulation, including section 202 (prohibiting “unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services”). It also contains the sections related to competition
on the network. See discussion infra Section III.C. In RIFO, the FCC chose to disavow all Title II
or “common carrier” authority over broadband, rather than “forbear” under Section 160, as the
latter would imply that Title II applied to broadband in the first instance. RIFO, supra note 2, at
407 para. 160, 416–17 para. 174.
32. The FCC reasoned that there was no severable transport element in what they saw as a
bundle of services making up broadband Internet access. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access
to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, GN Docket No. 00-185, Declaratory Ruling and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4870 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Order] (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs. (Brand X), 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
When this issue finally reached the Supreme Court, it punted. The Court deferred to the
FCC’s strained definition of broadband as a hybrid of transport and “information” services that
could not be teased apart, leaving it to Justice Scalia to point out the patent absurdity of this position.
The FCC’s logic was “too-clever-by-half,” he wrote, akin to a pizza parlor answering whether the
parlor offers delivery with “No, even though we bring the pizza to your house, we are not actually
‘offering’ you delivery, because the delivery that we provide . . . is ‘part and parcel’ of our pizzeriapizza-at-home service and is ‘integral to its other capabilities.’” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1007 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
For an exhaustive technical discussion of broadband as a telecommunications service, see
Scott Jordan, Broadband Internet Access Service Is a Telecommunications Service, 71 FED.
COMMC’NS L.J. 155 (2019).
33. See Open Internet Order, supra note 12, at 5682–83 para. 188, 5751–52 para. 346.
34. “Throttling” refers to the ISP practice of slowing a subscriber’s connection speeds, particularly when an ISP-imposed data cap is exceeded. See infra note 121.
These prohibitions were part of a fuller spectrum of protections, including a “general conduct rule” (“no unreasonable interference or unreasonable disadvantage”) and an enhanced transparency rule. See Open Internet Order, supra note 12, at 5915, 5659 para. 135, 5669 para. 155.
This Order was dubbed “Title II Order” by the later RIFO decision and accompanying text, in
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In December 2017, the Trump administration’s FCC rejected
this logic, completely undoing the 2015 rules.35 The FCC rationalized
the rejection of its previous rules by declaring that the Title II “telecommunications” provisions of the Communications Act did not apply to broadband, and therefore the Obama FCC had no authority to
issue the rules it did.36 The coup de grace was the Preemption Directive, invoking the “jurisdictionally interstate” meme to claim that
the FCC has exclusive jurisdiction over BIAS, and to preempt the
states from adopting their own rules going forward.37 The FCC
claimed any contrary state legislation (such as SB 822) would be incompatible with its policy of, and the 1996 Telecommunication Act’s
alleged preference for, “light touch” regulation of the Internet.38

recognition of the prior order’s reclassification of BIAS as a telecommunications or Title II service.
See discussion and sources cited supra note 31.
35. The FCC repealed the non-discrimination rules of the 2015 decision in toto, adding back
a significantly diminished transparency rule. It released its final order on January 4, 2018, reclassifying fixed (service to a known address) and mobile BIAS as a Title I “information service,” (and
reclassifying mobile broadband as a ‘private mobile service’). See RIFO, supra note 2, at 320–52,
paras. 26–64, 352–62 paras. 65–85, 466–80 paras. 263–83. The Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Clyburn derided it as the “Destroying Internet Freedom Order.” Id. at 533.
36. RIFO, supra note 2, at 312, para. 2. RIFO was just the FCC’s latest about-face on this
issue. A rough and incomplete summary of that back and forth might include:
• 1998 (and before): Broadband access is a telecommunications service (with a segregable
transport element). See Advanced Services Order, supra note 21, at 24029–30, para. 35
(“packet-switched services are . . . pure transmission services”); John Blevins, The FCC and
the “Pre-Internet,” 91 IND. L.J. 1309, 1314–15 (2016) (distinguishing information from telecommunications services).
• 2002:The FCC decides that broadband access is an information service because it is not
possible to separate the transmission element from the information service element, a variation on the “impossibility” theme. See Cable Modem Order, supra note 32.
• 2015:The FCC decides that broadband access contains a segregable transport component,
therefore BIAS is now a telecommunications common carrier service. Open Internet Order,
supra note 12, at 5610, para. 29.
• 2017:Broadband access is returned to its 2002 status, as an integrated information service
with no segregable transport component. See RIFO, supra note 2, at 312, para. 2.
Although the FCC puts a good face on these repeated reversals, e.g., in 2015, by pointing to different stages of the network’s development, the cynic might observe that nothing really changed in
those years other than the administration in power.
37. Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Mozilla), 940 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (labelling the preemption provisions of RIFO, supra note 2, at 426–32, paras. 194–204, as a “Preemption Directive”).
38. RIFO, supra note 2, at 432, 434–90, paras. 203, 207–303. By contrast, the 2015 Open
Internet Order only prohibited states from “inconsistent” rules which it said it would evaluate on a
case-by-case basis. Open Internet Order, supra note 12, at 5804, para. 433; see also discussion
infra Section III.C.1.
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The D.C. Circuit Court, ruling in late 2019 (in Mozilla Corp.
v. Federal Communications Commission39) on various challenges to
RIFO, rejected the Preemption Directive:
By reclassifying broadband as an information service, the
Commission placed broadband outside of its Title II [common carrier] jurisdiction. . . . Nor did Congress statutorily
grant the Commission freestanding preemption authority to
displace state laws even in areas in which it does not otherwise have regulatory power.
Neither can the Commission house the Preemption Directive in its ancillary authority under Title I. “Title I is not
an independent source of regulatory authority . . . .”40
[I]f the Commission cannot tether a rule of preemption
to a relevant source of statutory authority, courts “simply
cannot accept [the] argument that the [Commission] may
nevertheless take action which it thinks will best effectuate a
federal policy.”41
In other words, if the FCC (as it claimed) had no authority to
enact net neutrality regulations in the first place, then it had no authority to preempt the states’ adoption of similar regulations. In the California litigation (now at the Ninth Circuit),42 this means that the industry plaintiffs/appellants must convince the court that SB 822 conflicts
with what appears to be a small and general set of statutes, i.e., the
FCC’s statutory authority to regulate information services. California’s defense of the statute rests in large part on this lack of specific
authority.
This paper seeks to go beyond the defensive case, arguing that
the FCC’s abdication—coming at a moment of environmental, health,
and public safety crises—is also a moment of opportunity, revealing
underlying facts in a new light and allowing a reassessment of previous legal conclusions. From (roughly) 2002 through 2017, the focus
of net neutrality debate was at the federal level, and the argument

39. 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
40. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 75–76 (quoting State of Cal. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 905 F.2d
1217, 1241 n.35 (9th Cir. 1990)).
41. Id. at 80 (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Louisiana PSC),
476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986)).
42. ACA Connects v. Bonta, No. 21-15430 (9th Cir., argued Sept. 14, 2021); see chronology,
supra note 9.
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turned on whether broadband Internet access service providers were
telecommunications common carriers or mere information services.43
With the FCC’s disavowal of jurisdiction in its 2017 RIFO decision, the focus shifted to the states. The primary axis of argument
was/is no longer telecommunications vs. information service, but rather who gets to make this call, i.e., the relative authority of state and
federal regulators in this policy space.
C. Crafting State Net Neutrality Legislation
After the FCC disassociated itself from effective authority over
broadband, state governors, legislators, and regulators began to more
actively articulate their visions for a broadband future.44 States drafted
their own net neutrality rules.45 The bills signed into law fall into

43. See chronology, supra note 36.
44. E.g., Cal. Exec. Ord. N-73-20 (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/8.14.20-EO-N-73-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/TVW5-3KZQ] (recognizing the disparity in internet access or “digital divide,” and directing state agencies to submit plans aimed at
providing internet access to all Californians); Frontier California Inc. Opening Comments, Order
Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Broadband Infrastructure Deployment and to Support Service
Providers in the State of California, Rulemaking 20-09-001, at 9–11, (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Oct. 12, 2020) https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M348/K580/348580051.PDF
[https://perma.cc/BP4G-T25J].
45. See Heather Morton, Net Neutrality Legislation in States, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 23, 2019) https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/net-neutrality-legislation-in-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/YEP4-PWHD]; see
also later collections of state statutes, Heather Morton, Net Neutrality 2019 Legislation, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/net-neutrality-2019-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/DWC3XNJB]; Heather Morton, Net Neutrality 2020 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/net-neutrality-2020-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/WH64-SEKG] [hereinafter collectively
Morton, State Net Neutrality Legislation]; Steve Blum, The State of Washington Takes on Washington, DC with Its Own Net Neutrality Law, TELLUS VENTURE ASSOCS. (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.tellusventure.com/the-state-of-washington-takes-on-washington-dc-with-its-ownnet-neutrality-law/ [https://perma.cc/E8G2-XK5U] (“The State of Washington is the first to enact
a network neutrality law.”). Daniel A. Lyons, in his article State Net Neutrality, 80 U. PITT. L. REV.
905, 921–28 (2019), provides a useful summary of the state initiatives, both executive orders and
legislation. Harold Feld’s canvas of state efforts anticipates the Mozilla Court’s reversal of the
Preemption Directive, and the Dormant Commerce Clause issues which might ensue:
[I]t’s not enough to simply say that broadband is interstate. So are apples shipped from
Washington State to Maryland. That doesn’t stop Maryland from having a lot of say in
how apples get sold in Maryland, so long as Maryland doesn’t discriminate against apples grown outside the state and as long as Maryland regulation of the sale of apples
doesn’t contradict any federal law on the sale of apples.
Harold Feld, Can the States Really Pass Their Own Net Neutrality Laws? Here’s Why I Think Yes,
WETMACHINE (Feb. 6, 2018, 7:50 AM), https://wetmachine.com/tales-of-the-sausage-factory/canthe-states-really-pass-their-own-net-neutrality-laws-heres-why-i-think-yes/ [https://perma.cc/JRD
7-JXRN].
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several categories: (i) disclosure laws;46 (ii) laws requiring adherence
to the 2015 rules as a condition of receiving universal service subsidies47 or a qualification for the award of state contracts;48 and (iii) two
laws—in California (SB 822) and Washington State (SB 2282)—that
recast the prohibitions of the 2015 Open Internet Order as state law.49
The number of state bills that died on the vine, however,
greatly outnumbered those actually enacted.50 Any legislative attempt
to regulate broadband communications seems to touch a third rail. As
state legislatures met to cobble together their own versions of net neutrality legislation, it was inevitable that a lobbying “mosh pit” would
break out.51
The industry attacked—as it had at the federal level—any attempt to “regulate the Internet,”52 although it was not the “Internet”
46. Disclosure of network practices is implicit in most of the states’ laws, and explicit in the
Washington and California statutes referenced below. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
47. Colorado S.B. 78, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019), http://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2019A/bills/sl/2019a_sl_210.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE2Z-N8Y6] (renders
carrier ineligible for high cost support or other deployment subsidies if it engages in discriminatory
practices).
48. Oregon H.B. 4155, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018), https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2018R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/HB4155/Enrolled
[https://perma.cc/R58TF6P4]; Vermont S.B. 289, 289th Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2018), https://legislature.vermont.gov/Documents/2018/Docs/ACTS/ACT169/ACT169%20As%20Enacted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K9ZSNDRG] (incorporating a previous Executive Order requiring attorney general to review the network
management practices of ISPs in Vermont and determine whether they are in compliance with the
2015 FCC net neutrality rules and to disclose those findings); Maine Legis. Doc. 1384, 129th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019), http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=HP0986&
item=9&snum=129 [https://perma.cc/TX8U-LB5N].
49. Washington Substitute H.B. 2282, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018), https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2017-18/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/House/2282-S.SL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VPR-A24M]; California S.B. 822, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (enacting Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act of 2018, as described in footnote 7).
Of the state laws, California’s is the “most aggressive,” codifying the Open Internet Order’s unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard where Washington did not; it arguably also
goes further than the FCC’s in adopting bright-line rules on zero-rating and interconnection issues,
explicitly prohibiting payment from an edge provider in exchange for an ISP’s delivery of content
to end-users. See Lyons, supra note 45, at 927–28 (discussing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3101(a)(3), (6),
(9) (2021)); see also Open Internet Order, supra note 12, at 5648–49 para. 113, 5651–52 para. 120,
5685–87 paras. 193, 195, 5695–96 para. 206 (practices may be prohibited under the no-blocking,
no-throttling rules, and/or general conduct rule).
50. See Morton, State Net Neutrality Legislation, supra note 45.
51. See Susan P. Crawford, The Communications Crisis in America, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
245, 261 (2011) (imagining a “mosh pit of stakeholders” if and when Congress attempts a rewrite
of the Communications Act).
52. E.g., Press Release, Verizon, Title II Regulations a ‘Net’ Loss for Innovation and Consumers (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/VZ_NR_--_2-2615_VZ_Statement_on_Open_Internet_Order_FINAL_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/83GD-U46S].
Headlined “FCC’s ‘Throwback Thursday’ Move Imposes 1930s Rules on the Internet,” the press
release wins points for humor, with antique typewriter font and a faux 1934 date. Id. It purported
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that was at issue but the operation of its broadband substrate. This distinction was lost on many legislators.
The battle around the word “utility” was particularly pitched
in California. The State had suffered through several years of wildfires
and power-shutoffs, during which broadband connectivity had proven
to be essential. In January 2018, then California Attorney General Xavier Becerra called for state regulation of Internet access as a utility
(as it was in the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order): “Internet access is
a utility—just like water and electricity. And every consumer has a
right to access online content without interference or manipulation by
their internet service provider. In repealing the net neutrality rules, the
FCC ignored consumers’ strong support for a free and open Internet.”53
The large carrier ISPs and their allies predictably derided state
neutrality initiatives as an effort to fit broadband into a traditional utility framework, warning that 1930s (or nineteenth century in the more
hyperbolic telling) regulation of a twenty-first century industry was
inappropriate; most particularly, the industry did not want the California Public Utilities Commission involved in any way.54 Only two
months after Attorney General Becerra opined that ISPs needed to be
regulated as utilities, State Senator Scott Wiener asserted that there
would be no place for CPUC regulation of broadband providers in his
bill: “The one thing that a lot of people agreed on, from the ISPs to the
Electronic Frontier Foundation to a number of my colleagues, was that
we don’t want the [CPUC] to become the ground regulator of the

to challenge “an order urged by President Obama that imposes rules on broadband Internet services
that were written in the era of the steam locomotive and the telegraph.” Id.
53. Net Neutrality Battle in California, DIGIT. WEST (Jan. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/RG7M2LR2.
54. E.g., Mike Montgomery, Why Give Power Over Net Neutrality to CPUC?, SACRAMENTO
BEE (Apr. 18, 2018, 2:26 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/soapbox/article209244504
.html (claim by Montgomery, as representative of a coalition of tech groups including AT&T, that
CPUC is unfit to regulate); see Press Release, Verizon, supra note 52; infra note 55.
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Internet.”55 The specific semantics of “ground regulation of the Internet” were unclear, but the politics were not.56
A similar dynamic appears to have played out in Washington
State. Its law also adopts non-discrimination rules57 but explicitly
states they “may be enforced solely by the attorney general under the
consumer protection act,”58 leaving the State Utilities and Transportation Commission with only ministerial responsibility.59
Vermont’s bill (S.B. 289) is similarly limited. It applies neutrality requirements exclusively to ISPs contracting with the State.60 It
assigns the task of “ensur[ing] that any State government contract for
broadband Internet access service . . . contains terms and conditions
requiring that the Internet service provider certify that it is in
55. California Super Net Neutrality Bill, DIGIT. WEST (Mar. 19, 2018, 9:30 AM),
http://web.archive.org/web/20210117121009/https://blog.digitalwest.com/blog/super-net-neutrality-bill (alteration in original). There was indeed reason to question whether the CPUC was sufficiently resourced to alone draft and enforce net neutrality laws, as the California Senate Energy,
Utilities and Communications Committee analysis had noted:
[I]n recent years there have been questions raised concerning whether the CPUC is
spread too thin and handling too many varied areas. Just last year, the legislature passed
SB 19 (Hill, 2017) which removed some of the transportation-related functions away
from the CPUC to other agencies. This bill would expand to [sic] the CPUC’s existing
responsibilities. While it is not immediately clear whether it is feasible for the CPUC to
take on these responsibilities, in terms of staff and resources, the responsibilities are
potentially consistent with the CPUC’s role in regulating utility-style services.
S. COMM. ON ENERGY, UTILS. & COMMC’NS, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL NO. 460, 2017–2018
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) [hereinafter S. UTILS. COMM. ANALYSIS].
While this analysis is not incorrect, the CPUC is not unique; other enforcement agencies,
including the FCC and state attorneys general, face resource constraints and are subject to industry
capture and information asymmetry. See infra notes 272–313 and accompanying text.
56. The final version of S.B. 822 does not address how the law is to be enforced, nor does it
mention the CPUC. While the CPUC had a leading role in the initial version of the legislation, see
S. UTILS. COMM. ANALYSIS, supra note 55, the Legislature ultimately eliminated the agency’s regulatory and enforcement functions under the bill; a decision had reportedly been made that enforcement would be in the hands of the Attorney General. See Steve Blum, Prosecutors in, CPUC Out
as California’s Net Neutrality Enforcer, TELLUS VENTURE ASSOCS. (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.tellusventure.com/prosecutors-in-cpuc-out-as-californias-net-neutrality-enforcer/
[https://perma.cc/J5A4-N3SJ].
57. Washington Substitute H.B. 2282, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(2) (Wash. 2018), https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2017-18/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/House/2282-S.SL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VPR-A24M].
58. Id. § 2(2).
59. Compare id. § 4(2) (utility regulator’s only responsibility is giving notice “to affected parties”), with Telecommunications, WASH. UTILS. & TRANSP. COMM’N, https://www.utc.wa.gov/regulated-industries/utilities/telecommunications [https://perma.cc/XE75-7KL3] (Washington’s Utilities & Transportation Commission “regulates the rates and services of telephone companies
operating in the state of Washington”).
60. Vermont S.B. 289, 289th Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2018), https://legislature.vermont.gov/Docum
ents/2018/Docs/ACTS/ACT169/ACT169%20As%20Enacted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K9ZSNDRG].

(8) 55.1_WITTEMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

84

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/16/22 4:43 PM

[Vol. 55:65

compliance with the consumer protection and net neutrality standards”
to the State Secretary of Administration and Agency of Digital Services; the only role accorded the State’s Public Service Commission
is to consult with the Attorney General on a “study” of net neutrality
best practices going forward, to be drafted by the Attorney General.61
The omission of any reference to common carriage or role for
state utility commissions leads to a contradiction. The new state laws
fit the mold of the FCC’s 2015 non-discrimination rules. Such nondiscrimination laws have traditionally been considered common carriage, as the Verizon court recognized.62 Even though the state legislatures were arguably writing on a clean slate post-Mozilla, the new
laws eschew the common carriage label and with it (apparently) a
meaningful role for state utility agencies.
The contradiction has consequences. As explained below, regulation of telecommunications carriers’ last-mile and local access networks has historically been the province of state commissions. Avoiding a state utility commission role and common carriage label
compromises state authority over these networks and disregards the
physical reality of BIAS delivery.63
D. Defending State Net Neutrality Legislation
Even with such concessions, the U.S. Department of Justice
filed a complaint within hours of the Governor’s signature.64 The ISP
industry quickly followed suit in California,65 and added a parallel

61. Id. §§ 3–4, 8–9.
62. Verizon v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 740 F.3d 623, 650–51 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (courts have
“resorted to the common law to come up with a satisfactory definition” of common carriage); see
supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
63. See discussion infra Sections III.A.1, III.A.3, and particularly III.C.3.
64. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, United States v. California, No. 2:18-at01539 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1097306/download [https://perma.cc/8WP6-FCBT]; Justice Department Files Net Neutrality Lawsuit Against the
State of California, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-files-net-neutrality-lawsuit-against-state-california-0 [https://perma.cc/4NGE-4M5P].
65. Complaint, Am. Cable Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 2:18-at-01552 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018),
https://acaconnects.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ISP-lawsuit.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DWP3767U]. The American Cable Association (ACA) was joined by a number of other carriers. The
ACA filed an Amended Complaint and renewed its Motion for Preliminary Injunction in August
2020. First Amended Complaint, Am. Cable Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 2:18-cv-02684 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 5, 2020) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint], https://www.eff.org/files/2020/09/25/
first_amended_complaint_8.5.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RX8-Q3KV]; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Am. Cable
Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 2:18-cv-02684 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Renewed
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complaint two weeks later in Vermont (months after Vermont’s bill
had become law).66 The United States dismissed its action after the
2021 change in administration,67 leaving the ISP complaints in California and Vermont as the only active challenges to state net neutrality
laws.68
The parties in both states agreed to a stay while the D.C. Circuit considered challenges to RIFO in the Mozilla v FCC docket, including petitions filed by the CPUC and other state and local government entities asking for review of RIFO’s broad preemptive
provisions.69 The California litigation resumed after the court in
Mozilla ruled and the time for appeal had run. The Vermont parties
agreed to a second stay, making American Cable Association v.
Becerra the lead case in the country.70 On July 30, 2020, California
District Court Judge John Mendez issued an order setting dates for
hearing the motions to enjoin enforcement of SB 822.71
This was in some respects perfect timing for the bill’s prospects. The D.C. Circuit, while upholding the FCC’s decision to remove broadband from the telecommunications rules, rejected the

Motion], https://www.eff.org/files/2020/09/25/plaintiffs_memorandum_for_preliminary_injunction_8.5.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3Q6-2ZP6].
66. Complaint, Am. Cable Ass’n v. Scott, No. 2:18-cv-167 (D. Vt. Oct. 18, 2018), https://acaconnects.org/u-s-district-court-for-the-district-of-vermont-complaint-w-ctia-ncta-necta-andustelecom-re-vermonts-senate-bill-289-and-vermont-executive-order-no-2-18/ [https://perma.cc/
M7HJ-WH8D].
67. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Dismissal, United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv-02660 (Feb. 8,
2021),
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.caed.344015/gov.uscourts.caed.344
015.44.0_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH78-CVVJ]; Jon Reid, Justice Department Drops California
Net Neutrality Fight (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 8, 2012, 1:23 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/justice-department-drops-suit-against-california-net-neutralitylaw [https://perma.cc/N83U-WKK3].
68. Vermont’s opening gambit was a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, arguing the ISPs
had not alleged that any specific ISP suffered identifiable injury by the law, nor could they. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Partially Consented to Motion to Stay or Phase Discovery at 1–2,
Am. Cable Ass’n v. Scott, No. 2:18-cv-167 (D. Vt. Dec. 24, 2018), ECF No. 24. Many of the ISPs
had publicly advertised that they followed net neutrality principles; accordingly, Vermont argued
they could not be harmed by codification of such principles. Id. at 2. This argument became moot
(at least for the time being) in Vermont as the California litigation proceeded to the Ninth Circuit
(the argument was not raised in California).
69. See, e.g., Proof Brief for Government Petitioners, Mozilla Corp v. Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n, No. 18-1051 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 20, 2018) (filed by and relating to the separate Petitions for
Review of the State of New York, Santa Clara County and Santa Clara County Fire Dept., and the
CPUC) (“The Commission May Not Preempt Absent Statutory Authority.”).
70. See chronology set forth in footnote 9, supra.
71. Order Regarding Resumption of Litigation and Scheduling (as Modified by the Court),
Am. Cable Ass’n v. Becerra No. 2:18-cv-02684 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2020), ECF No. 51.
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FCC’s Preemption Directive.72 Things had also changed on the
ground. Nationwide, pandemic stay-at-home orders ushered in a new
level of reliance on broadband. Natural disasters in California and
other states—wildfires, windstorms, and public safety power shutoffs
to protect against both—added to the realization that broadband Internet access was essential, although not always reliable.73 It had become
clear that “network neutrality” was no longer just a question of the
consumer’s access to entertainment, but an urgent public safety and
welfare concern.
The removal of the CPUC from SB 822, however, had put California in a difficult position—how to defend the law without referencing what had been taken out of it, namely the history of the State’s
telecommunications oversight and enforcement (and the common carriage regime that implies). Closely related was the State’s apparent
acceptance—at least for the sake of argument—of “interstate information services” as the appropriate classification for broadband Internet access.74
California’s defense relied on the ruling in Mozilla that the
FCC had no ability to preempt state BIAS rules after it found it had no
authority to propound such rules.75 The State appeared to argue that it
has police power to regulate BIAS even if it were an “interstate information service” (while rejecting reference to SB 822 as “common carrier regulation”).76 Without federal preemptive authority, the limits to

72. Mozilla v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1, 78–80 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
73. Jenna Leventoff, The California Wildfires Show Why We Need a National Backup Power
Mandate to Keep Americans Connected During Disasters, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/the-california-wildfires-show-why-we-need-a-nationalbackup-power-mandate-to-keep-americans-connected-during-disasters/ [https://perma.cc/K3KU7TM2].
74. Although California never explicitly embraces the “interstate” or “information service”
categories for broadband service, it never rejects them either, all the while distancing itself from
the notion that S.B. 822 might constitute common carrier regulation. See infra note 76.
75. California Opposition, supra note 16, at 18 (“Such an ‘abdication of authority’ is of ‘dubious preemptive effect.’” (quoting ACA Connects – Am.’s Commc’ns Ass’n v. Frey, 471 F. Supp.
3d 318, 326 (D. Me. 2020))).
76. Id. at 28 n.25 (California “Defendants do not concede that SB 822 enacts common carrier
regulations . . . .”); id. at 32 (no congressional intent “to preempt the field of all ‘interstate communications services’” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 35 (“[T]he Act affirmatively prohibits implied
preemption—including field preemption—with respect to information services.”); id. at 36 (“Under
Plaintiffs’ Sweeping Theory of Field Preemption, All State Regulation of Information Services
Would Be Preempted, but That Is Not the Law.”); see also infra note 78 (describing State’s response to court’s question about BIAS as common carriage). California’s defense is consistent with
47 U.S.C § 152(b), which preserves states’ jurisdiction over intrastate “communications,” a broader
category than telecommunications services—an argument not pursued in the Opposition.
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California’s action are not in the Telecommunications Act but (if at
all) in the dormant commerce clause.77 Public utility law was not mentioned.
That defense has been successful to date. On February 23,
2021, Judge Mendez denied the ISPs’ renewed motion for a preliminary injunction, rejecting the allegation that broadband’s classification
as an interstate information service was sufficient to put it beyond the
reach of state government.78 The matter is on appeal at the Ninth Circuit.79
The long-range problems remain, however. With utility common carriage eliminated from the discourse, empirical casualties follow. Missing from the defense of SB 822, for example, was the state’s
ongoing (albeit contested) exercise of police power over BIAS providers—to ensure public health and welfare,80 to manage competition in
77. Id. at 47 & n.49 (“[T]he purported harm that SB 822 will allegedly have an effect beyond
California is more properly considered under ISP Plaintiffs’ dormant commerce clause claim,
which is not raised in their preliminary injunction motion.”).
78. See Cecilia Kang, California Wins Court Victory for Its Net Neutrality Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/technology/california-net-neutrality.html
[https://perma.cc/2BXC-PE33].
When Judge Mendez, at the preliminary injunction hearing, asked whether the State was
reclassifying BIAS as common carriage “without calling it a reclassification,” the State’s attorney
answered in terms of California’s “plenary authority to . . . protect health and safety,” without addressing the reclassification question per se. Transcript of Proceedings at 37–38, Am. Cable Ass’n
v. Becerra, No. 18-CV-2684 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2021) (adding that federal law limiting which entities are subject to common carrier regulation by the FCC does not have “any effect on what the
States can do”).
A New York District Court criticized its California counterpart for having the jurisdictional question “backwards,” finding instead that FCC “jurisdiction writ large, over interstate communications transmitted by information services” survived the FCC’s disowning its specific statutory authority under Title II. N.Y. State Telecomms. Ass’n v. James, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
110127, at *24 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2021). Aside from ignoring the localized nature of broadband delivery and accepting uncritically its “jurisdictionally interstate” classification, the New
York Court also appears to confuse subject matter jurisdiction with specific statutory authorization
to act. See Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 600 F.3d 642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (action
must be “reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities”).
79. See supra note 9; Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Broadband Provider Associations, ACA Connects – Am.’s Commc’ns Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 21-15430 (9th Cir. Apr. 6. 2021)
[hereinafter Appellants’ Opening Brief], https://www.eff.org/files/2021/04/14/american_cable_association_et_al._v._becerra_-_9th_circuit_opening_brief_of_aca_et_al._2021.04.06_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7EE-4A4F]. Appellants filed their Opening Brief shortly before Attorney General Bonta succeeded Attorney General Becerra and before Bonta was substituted as the Appellee.
The appeal is now captioned ACA Connects v. Bonta.
Oral argument in the Ninth Circuit was held on September 14, 2021 (video at
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/video/?20210914/21-15430/).
80. The CPUC has taken a number of emergency measures to address both climate and coronavirus crises. See discussion infra Sections III.A, III.C.
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the last-mile bottlenecks (acknowledged and incorporated in the 1996
Act),81 to promote broadband deployment and bridge the digital divide,82 and to referee access to rights-of-way and utility infrastructure
enabling BIAS delivery.83 When the Opposition brief states that “SB
822 is a classic exercise of state police power to protect consumers,
public health, and public safety,”84 the reader has little idea what that
specifically means.
The omission of the state’s history of telecommunications regulation, including broadband, can be seen as a constraint built into SB
822’s elimination of a role for the CPUC. The acceptance of “interstate” and “information service” as descriptions of broadband can be
read as conceding the current legal consensus, an apparently winning
tactic on the immediate preemption question.85 Such omissions and
concessions are, however, problematic in terms of a medium- and
long-range broadband law and policy.
A threshold concern is that the state’s history of regulating telecommunications might become relevant to application of the “presumption against pre-emption” on appeal; California conceded that the
application of the presumption turns on “the historic presence of state
law” rather the historic “absence of federal regulation,”86 without further describing that history.
81. See discussion infra Sections III.C.3, III.C.4.a.
82. See discussion infra Section III.C.4.b; see also supra note 13.
83. See discussion infra Sections III.A.2, III.C.4.a.
84. See California Opposition, supra note 16, at 13. The State’s Opposition Declarations, supra note 27, provide insight into various BIAS use cases, and the harms that businesses and government entities might suffer if broadband connectivity is left unregulated. They collectively build
a compelling narrative of the growing importance of the broadband to all aspects of society but
reveal little of the ongoing and historical state broadband-related interventions referenced supra
notes 80–83.
85. See discussion infra Section III.B.; cf. Brief of Professors of Communications Law as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12 n.8, Mozilla Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 27, 2018) (No. 18-1051) (“[W]hen a service falls within the Commission’s
interstate jurisdiction—as broadband internet access likely does, at least to some extent . . . —the
Commission must still demonstrate that it has statutory authority to preempt state regulation of that
service.” (emphasis added)) (signed by at least one of the amici in the California litigation).
86. California Opposition, supra note 16, at 13–14, 13 n.10:
Any preemption analysis must “start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); see also,
e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (describing the “presumption
against the pre-emption of state police power regulations” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). “[I]t is a state’s historic police power—not preemption—that [courts]
must assume, unless clearly superseded by federal statute.” United States v. California,
921 F.3d 865, 887 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
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In the context of broader public debate, such omissions reflect
the fact-light approach to constitutional questions,87 serve to perpetuate legal fictions such as “jurisdictionally interstate,” and prolong the
generally unstable nature of net neutrality discourse.
Lastly, a factually deracinated discussion of preemption does
not convey the real-world problems California and other states face.
The exercise of state police power to meet COVID-19 and climate
emergencies, detailed below, depends in large part on states’ ability to
assert jurisdiction over broadband connectivity. The states could win
the battles in California and Vermont, but lose the war. The ISPs have
argued that California has no jurisdiction to ensure public safety by
requiring backup power in broadband networks,88 no jurisdiction to
safeguard a functioning “Next Generation” 911 system,89 and no jurisdiction to meaningfully promote broadband competition.90 The
ISPs’ rejection of state jurisdiction affects a number of related issues;
what is missing is a state response that connects the dots.
III. THE STATES’ ROLE, FROM THE GROUND UP
A. State Regulation of BIAS: California—a Case Study
As the California litigation is now the de facto lead case in the
country, this Article focuses in significant part on California to illustrate the extent of state police power involved in the delivery of broadband connectivity.

California also cites New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC v. Picker, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (N.D. Cal.
2016), a preemption dispute growing out of the CPUC’s 2016 competition investigation. California
Opposition, supra note 16, at 13 n.10. The court in New Cingular acknowledged that “states have
long had a role in regulating local communications,” creating “at least a fair argument that the
presumption [against preemption] applies.” 216 F. Supp. 3d at 1070 n.7.
California offers citation to California privacy, false advertising, and criminal laws, California Opposition, supra note 16, at 9–10, but no mention of the state’s Public Utilities Code or
history of telecommunications regulation. See discussion infra Sections III.A and III.C.
87. FAIGMAN, supra note 4.
88. See history cited supra note 13.
89. Id.; see also Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Emergency Disaster Relief Program, Rulemaking18-03-011, AT&T California’s (U 1001 C) and AT&T Corp.’s (U 5002 C) Verified Response to Administrative Law Judge’s Ruling Regarding Order to Show Cause, at 30 (Cal.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 6, 2020) (“[N]o state statute expressly authorizes the [CPUC] to regulate
IP-enabled services, including NG911.”).
90. See supra note 13; see also infra Sections III.C.2–.3.
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1. State Police Power in Response to Climate Emergency and Public
Health Crises
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
“powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”91 “[T]he protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons . . . within the State” has long been considered
part of the retained states’ “police power.”92
For over a year, people across the country sheltered in their
homes because of a virus.93 In California, Oregon, and other states,
climate change also hit home, with wildfires and flooding part of the
new normal.94 In these compounding crises, broadband Internet access
has proven to be a crucial interconnection point, allowing emergency
warning systems, telemedicine, online shopping (particularly for atrisk individuals), online judicial, legislative, and administrative functions, telework, online education, and online supply chain and manufacturing processes.
These crises have brought long-standing structural problems to
the fore—lack of competition for broadband access and resulting affordability issues, uneven deployment of fiber and other high-speed
transport systems, and the documented decline in service quality, as
described below. Where connectivity is inequitably distributed, the
digital divide rears its head. Those with ample bandwidth—often welleducated digital nomads—work from home; those with financial resources travel to destinations where broadband access is robust; those
without connectivity or the means to travel are consigned to work from
91. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
92. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1873) (quoting Thorpe v. Rutland &
Burlington R.R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 149 (1855)). The states’ inherent police power unquestionably
includes authority to protect the health and safety of their citizens. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (“Throughout our history the several States have exercised their police powers
to protect the health and safety of their citizens. Because these are ‘primarily, and historically, . . .
matter[s] of local concern,’ the ‘States traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.’”
(omission and alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985); and then quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985))).
93. Sarah Mervosh et al., One Year, 400,000 Coronavirus Deaths: How the U.S. Guaranteed
Its Own Failure, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/17/us/coviddeaths-2020.html [https://perma.cc/MQK8-MKPX].
94. See Cameron Peters, The West Is Burning. Climate Change Is Making It Worse, VOX
(July 25, 2021, 4:26 PM), https://www.vox.com/2021/7/25/22592004/wildfires-climate-changereconciliation-bill [https://perma.cc/534S-RMB9].
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library parking lots or abandon online employment- and educationrelated opportunities altogether.
Plaintiff ISPs and their amici argue that market competition
alone will solve these problems, provide for emergency communications, and produce the neutral “last mile” required by first responders,
health professionals, consumers, and businesses.95 The market, however, has failed, and states and local governments across the country
have stepped in to remedy that failure.96
2. State Police Power, Grounded in Property Law and Embedded in
the State Constitution
While not as topical as public health and safety regulation,
state property, public utility, and public works laws also embody the
exercise of state police power, and make BIAS delivery possible in the
first instance.
The broadband wire (or radio signal) must reach the subscriber. California Government Code section 53066 gives cable television providers the right, per municipal franchise or ordinance, to
string their coaxial cable (and other transmission media including fiber) along public streets and over private “backyard” easements.97
Other state laws give similar rights to traditional telephone providers,
allowing use of public rights-of-way and “any public road or highway”
subject to some local oversight.98 Although enacted to ensure cable

95. The FCC itself continued to take this position through the end of 2020. See Restoring
Internet Freedom, WC Docket No. 17-108, Order on Remand, 35 FCC Rcd. 12328, 12344–69
paras. 32–67 (2020) [hereinafter RIFO Remand Order], https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-20-151A1_Rcd.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GDD-C37M].
96. See, e.g., State Broadband Policy Explorer: Laws Governing High-Speed Internet Access,
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-visualizations/2019/state-broadband-policy-explorer [https://perma.cc/TS72-LAXL] (cataloguing 845 state broadband-related statutes as of January 1, 2020); see also discussion infra Sections III.A.3, III.B.3, III.C.2.b–.c (discussing the application of state police power to correct
broadband market failure).
97. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53066 (enacted 1963). Section 53066 was promulgated long before
cable systems began offering broadband connectivity. It provides that cities “may authorize the
grantee . . . to place wires, conduits and appurtenances for the community antenna television system
along or across such public streets, highways, alleys, public properties, or public easements of said
city or county or city and county.” Id. The Cable Act of 1984 sought to federalize this right of
access. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (2018) (right to access easements “dedicated for compatible
uses”).
98. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 7901 (enacted 1951). It provides “Telegraph or telephone corporations may construct lines of telegraph or telephone lines along and upon any public road or
highway, along or across any of the waters or lands within this State, and may erect poles, posts,
piers, or abutments . . . .” Id.
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and telephone access, such laws have been re-functionalized to allow
broadband providers de facto entrée to the same routes, as discussed
below under the rubric of “regulatory arbitrage.”
The broadband wire’s path from the cable headend or telephone central office to the end user also depends on access to support
structures—poles and conduits—owned at least in part by other utilities. In California and other states, access to those facilities is regulated
under state law and enforced by state commissions,99 which regulation
has been acknowledged and ratified by federal statute.100 The state
also regulates the safety of electric and telecommunications lines, their
clearances from, and non-interference with, one another, and seeks to
harmonize wireless cell siting with environmental and local concerns.101
Upstream from the central office or headend, broadband carriers need to interconnect with other carriers in order to deliver subscribers’ voice and online content requests to their intended addressees, and
to carry voice and content back to the subscriber; carriers rely on state
regulatory agencies to compel or arbitrate physical interconnection
agreements with other carriers.102
State police power also comes to the fore in property disputes
relating to carriers’ access to the rights of way described above, e.g.,
when a property owner challenges the right of non-utility cable companies, or regulated entities deploying non-utility services, to use easements dedicated for utility purposes.103 While these challenges have

99. In 1951, the California Legislature assigned to the CPUC the task of resolving support
structure access rights among utilities. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 767. In 1980, the state extended
that right to cable television corporations. Id. § 767.5; see discussion infra Section III.C.4.a.
100. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c) (“Nothing in this section shall . . . give the Commission jurisdiction . . .
for pole attachments in any case where such matters are regulated by a State.”); id. § 253(c) (“Nothing in this section affects the authority of a State or local government to manage the public rightsof-way . . . .”).
101. See discussion of CPUC General Orders particularly those dealing with public safety, infra
Section III.C.4.a.
102. Interconnection obligations under state law were codified in CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 558
and later partially federalized by the 1996 Telecommunications Act. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–252;
discussion infra Section III.C.4.a; see also discussion of regulatory arbitrage infra Section III.C.1.
103. See generally Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television, 212 Cal. Rptr. 31, 32, 165 Cal. App. 3d
798, 800 (Ct. App. 1985) (appellant’s property was subject to an easement “for the stringing of
telephone and electric light and power wires thereon”); Witteman v. Jack Barry Cable TV, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 584, 586, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1619 (Ct. App. 1986) (plaintiff’s predecessor(s) granted two easements, one to the City of Los Angeles “for the transmission of electrical energy over and across”
the property, and one to General Telephone “for the transmission of electrical energy and for telephone lines”) (the author represented his parents on appeal). Plaintiffs in both cases argued that
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most often been rejected by state courts, the salient fact is that these
cases are adjudicated, in large part, under “ancient” doctrines of property law, and are thus governed by the “local action” doctrine, which
holds that disputes over property rights must be tried in the state or
locality where the property is held.104
Since achieving statehood in 1850, California has authorized
and regulated “the construction and maintenance of telegraph lines in
the roads, highways and other public places in the state,” further evidence of its historic and “sovereign” role as property rights arbiter.105
Such state law provisions are preserved by section 414 of the Communications Act: “Nothing in this chapter contained shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.”106 The system of state laws that structure BIAS delivery is discussed further in Section III.C.4 below.
The protection of telephone, telegraph, and other utility networks is written into the California Constitution, which designates the
CPUC as the primary utility enforcement body in the state.107

cable television (as then constituted) was an entertainment service outside the scope of the public
utility easements.
A variation on this theme appears in Koponen v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 81 Cal. Rptr.
3d 22, 24, 165 Cal. App. 4th 345, 348 (Ct. App. 2008), where the servient property owner challenged PG&E’s right to install unregulated commercial fiber, intended in part for resale, in an easement granted for “furnishing and supplying electricity, light, heat and power to the public.” Id.
The fact that electric utilities are now effectively offering commercial fiber transport also
points to the need for inter-sectoral state utility agencies. See infra Sections III.C.4.a, III.D, notes
276–283 and accompanying text.
As to broadband carriers’ use of public utility easements, see Benjamin W. Cramer, Right
Way Wrong Way: The Fading Legal Justifications for Telecommunications Infrastructure Rightsof-Way, 40 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 996, 1004 (2016) (“[E]ven though [telecom] firms are shedding
their common carrier responsibilities, they are likely to continue insisting that they should receive
[utility easement] benefits.” (alteration in original)). A version of this article is available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2580017.
104. See Eldee-K Rental Props., LLC v. DIRECTV, Inc., 748 F.3d 943, 946, 948, 953 (9th Cir.
2014) (affirming trial court’s denial of certification of nationwide class of landowners because the
“ancient” local action principles of common law require that “actions directly operating on real
estate or personal actions closely connected with real property” be tried in the locality where the
real property lies, and noting that “the federal district courts’ jurisdiction over actions concerning
real property is generally coterminous with the states’ political boundaries”).
105. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 17 Cal. Rptr. 687, 690, 699, 197
Cal. App. 2d 133, 142, 153 (Ct. App. 1961) (“The state was acting in its sovereign capacity when
it adopted [the predecessor of Cal. Pub. Utils. Code § 7901].”).
106. 47 U.S.C. § 414.
107. CAL. CONST. art. XII.
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3. Application of State Police Power to Correct Broadband Market
Failure
Record wildfires, windstorms, power outages, and a worldwide pandemic have pushed states’ integrated telephone and broadband infrastructure to the brink. The competitive market has been insufficient to ensure network resiliency.108
In 2007, an overloaded utility pole with an unauthorized fiber
line on it failed during a windstorm in Malibu canyon, leading to a
catastrophic fire and millions of dollars in damages.109 “Windstorms
in 2011 knocked down a large number of poles in Southern California,
many of which were later found to be weakened by termites, dry rot,
and fungal decay,” causing three deaths in one instance.110 In 2014,
one cut fiber cable on AT&T’s network in Mendocino took down all
emergency 911 broadband communications for western Mendocino
County at a time when major wildfires were burning, largely because
of the lack of redundant routing; similar incidents occurred the following year.111 In the 2018 Paradise Fire, cell phone towers failed not

108. See ECONS. & TECH., INC., EXAMINATION OF THE LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
NETWORKS AND RELATED POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF AT&T CALIFORNIA AND FRONTIER
CALIFORNIA (2019) [hereinafter NETWORK EXAM], https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-websit
e/divisions/communications-division/documents/network-exam-documents/network-exam-reportapril-2019-compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/P72M-NYMJ]; see also Network Exam of AT&T and
Frontier/Verizon, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N [hereinafter Network Exam Summary],
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/internet-and-phone/service-quality-and-etc/networ
k-exam-of-att-and-frontier-verizon [https://perma.cc/D5FR-LHKM] (providing particularly helpful executive summaries). This CPUC-ordered report on the incumbent telecommunications providers’ service quality found a network suffering from chronic underinvestment—particularly in
poorer and rural areas with less competition—and poor management. See NETWORK EXAM, supra,
at 1–3 (further noting overall service quality decline over 8-year study period, disinvestment, and
deteriorating infrastructure); see also discussion of the NETWORK EXAM, infra Section III.C.2.c.
109. Order Instituting Investigation into the Creation of a Shared Database or Statewide Census
of Utility Poles and Conduit in California, Investigation 17-06-027; Order Instituting Rulemaking
into Access by Competitive Communications Providers to California Utility Poles & Conduit, Consistent with the Commission’s Safety Regulations, Rulemaking 17-06-028, slip op. at 2, 9 (Cal.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n July 10, 2017) [hereinafter Poles and Conduit Proceeding],
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M191/K656/191656519.PDF
[https://
perma.cc/XF6W-UB2C].
110. Id. at 2; see also id. at 9–10.
111. See CNTY. MENDOCINO, INCIDENT REPORT DETAILS PUBLIC SAFETY ISSUES FROM NONREDUNDANT BROADBAND NETWORKS 1, 4 (2014), http://www.mendocinobroadband.org/wp-cont
ent/uploads/Incident-Report-from-county-website.complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ2F-ZMWY];
see also N. BAY/N. COAST BROADBAND CONSORTIUM & BROADBAND ALL. MENDOCINO CNTY.,
SEPT. 2015 TELECOMMUNICATION OUTAGE AND THE IMPACTS ON RESIDENTS OF MENDOCINO
CNTY. 1–2 (Dec. 2015), http://www.mendocinobroadband.org/wp-content/uploads/Outage-Report
-as-approved-11216-by-BoS.pdf [https://perma.cc/S38E-J9LQ] (recounting further outages on
AT&T’s network).
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because they burned but because the power supply failed and the carriers had no backup power.112 A 2019 planned Public Safety Power
Shutoff (PSPS) highlighted this issue, when it caused over 50 percent
of cell sites in affluent Marin County to fail when the power went
off.113
These are the sort of local and state “retail” issues for which
the FCC often lacks resources. The exercise of state police power to
address public safety is not only protected by the Tenth Amendment
but is also a practical necessity.114 Courts have consistently upheld the
state’s police power in matters involving public welfare.115

112. See Lisa M. Krieger, Camp Fire Created a Black Hole of Communication, MERCURY
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2018), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/12/16/camp-fire-created-a-blackhole-of-communication/ [https://perma.cc/QD32-D9WR]:
County logs from Nov. 8 show that messages reached 16,683 phones but failed to reach
another 10,869 despite repeated attempts. . . . In the eastern Paradise neighborhoods first
hit by fire, about 56 percent of the 4,272 emergency alert calls failed due to what
CodeRED manufacturer OnSolve calls “operator intercept” or “timed out,” meaning that
the phone has been disconnected, the number changed or no longer in service, or—most
likely—the network didn’t find sufficient signal strength or bandwidth to make the call
work, due to cell tower failure.
113. Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Emergency Disaster Relief Program, Rulemaking 18-03-011, Decision Adopting Wireless Provider Resiliency Strategies, Decision No. 20-07011, slip op. at 123, Finding of Fact 8 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n July 16, 2020),
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M344/K021/344021480.PDF
[https://perma.cc/P7A5-BPPZ] (“According to the FCC Disaster Information Reporting System reports, . . . 57 percent of cell sites in Marin County alone were out of service between October 26–
27, 2019.”).
114. E.g., Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Emergency Disaster Relief Program, Rulemaking 18-03-011, Decision Adopting an Emergency Disaster Relief Program for Communications
Service Provider Customers, Decision 19-08-025, slip op. at 35 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Aug. 15,
2019) (“[S]tate police power . . . is what we exercise here, in adopting measures to ensure public
safety through a functioning communications network . . . .”); Mozilla v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,
940 F.3d 1, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[T]he California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
‘depends on broadband access, speed, and reliability’ in order to ‘track fire threats, fires, and manage forests and vegetation’ to prevent fires.”); cf. Pac. Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
(PG&E), 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374, 382, 416, 237 Cal. App. 4th 812, 824 (Ct. App. 2015) (upholding
$14.35 million penalty under section 451, for failure to keep essential gas safety records). The
CPUC’s public safety authority is further reflected in the Commission’s oversight of 911 service.
CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 742 (2021) (911 for public telephones); § 2883 (911 service and “warm
lines”); § 2889.6 (information to customers regarding 911); § 2892 (repealed 2017) (required wireless carriers to provide access to 911 service). (Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations herein
are to statutes enrolled and effective as of the publication of this article.)
115. See Tenth Amendment cases cited supra note 92; PG&E, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 378–79, 237
Cal. App. 4th 812; Commc’ns Telesystems Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1165,
1171 (N.D. Cal., 1998) (upholding State’s police power, citing 47 U.S.C. § 253(b) to impose “requirements necessary to . . . protect the public safety and welfare”), aff’d Commc’ns Telesystems
Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 196 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Pac. Bell Wireless,
LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 733, 740, 746, 140 Cal. App. 4th 718, 728, 736 (Ct.
App. 2006) (noting “[t]he commission is a state agency of constitutional origin with far-reaching
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In order to mitigate the safety issues of overloaded poles and
promote access to those poles by competitive providers, the CPUC instituted an Investigation into the Creation of a Shared Database or
Statewide Census of Utility Poles and Conduit in California, in an attempt to bring big data solutions to festering network problems.116
In response to the Paradise Fire and other network failures, and
more generalized concerns about the emergency preparedness of the
telecommunications network, the CPUC ordered wireless carriers to
have backup power at their cell sites in high fire threat areas,117 and
wireline carriers to have backup power in their remote terminals and
“all facilities that carry 9-1-1 traffic.”118 In this instance, the CPUC
was acting where the FCC had not119 (although the FCC’s Technological Advisory Council had stressed the need for greater network resiliency120).
duties, functions and powers,” upholding $12.1 million fine and restitution for deceptive sales and
business practices under § 451).
California Public Utilities Code section 451 articulates a “just and reasonable” standard
which guides the state’s assertion of authority over services and facilities of telephone, electricity,
gas, water, and other utilities (the operations of which often overlap and reach into other states):
Every public utility shall furnish and maintain such adequate, efficient, just, and reasonable service,
instrumentalities, equipment, and facilities, including telephone facilities, as defined in Section
54.1 of the Civil Code, as are necessary to promote the safety, health, comfort, and convenience of
its patrons, employees, and the public. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 451.
116. Poles and Conduit Proceeding, supra note 109, at 24 (exploring the possibility of a
statewide pole & conduit database).
117. Decision Adopting Wireless Provider Resiliency Strategies, supra note 113, at 2, 83–84
(“72-Hours of Backup Power, with Flexible Procurement and Deployment . . .”).
118. Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Emergency Disaster Relief Program, Rulemaking 18-03-011, Decision Adopting Wireline Provider Resiliency Strategies, Decision 21-02-029,
slip op. at 14–15 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Feb. 11, 2021), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs
/Published/G000/M366/K625/366625041.PDF [https://perma.cc/YZ7C-L4BY]. See also infra
note 125 and accompanying text (911 services provided over broadband).
119. The apex of the FCC’s effort was its Order on Reconsideration, requiring backup power
at cell sites. Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
Katrina on Communications Networks, EB Docket No. 06-119, WC Docket No. 06-63, Order on
Reconsideration, 22 FCC Rcd. 18013, 18024 para. 25 (2007), https://www.fcc.gov/document/reco
mmendations-independent-panel-reviewing-impact-hurricane-0 [https://perma.cc/G7HG-KDCU].
An industry consortium appealed the post-Katrina backup power requirements, ultimately leading
the FCC to abandon them. CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 530 F.3d 984,
986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (stay issued). The case was dismissed in 2009 because the Office of
Management and Budget had—at industry’s request—refused to approve the FCC regulations.
OFF. OF INFO. & REGUL. AFFS., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
NOTICE OF OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET ACTION, ICR Reference No. 200802-3060019 (Nov. 28, 2008), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=200802-3060019# [https://perma.cc/WSY6-KPZK]. The FCC did not pursue the issue further. See CTIA-The
Wireless Ass’n, 530 F.3d at 990.
120. FCC TECH. ADVISORY COUNCIL: COMMC’NS RESILIENCY WORKING GRP., POST-PSTN
PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS RESILIENCY 9, 15 (2013) [hereinafter FCC TECH. ADVISORY
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The California Legislature has also acted to insulate emergency broadband access from the well-documented and repeated throttling of county fire equipment during major wildfire incidents in
2018–19.121 Enacted in October 2019, AB 1699122 seeks to ensure essential wireless communications facilities remain available during
emergencies123 by prohibiting carrier throttling or interfering with
broadband channels used by first responders:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, upon receiving a request pursuant to subdivision (b), the mobile internet service provider shall not impair or degrade the lawful
internet traffic of the first response agency’s identified account until the earlier of either the account no longer being
used by the agency in response to the emergency or the end
COUNCIL], https://transition.fcc.gov/oet/tac/tacdocs/reports/2013/Resiliency_White_Paper-FCC_
TAC-2013-FINAL_working_group_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJA5-NNMQ] (noting dependence of communications networks on electric power networks).
121. Verizon’s throttling of emergency fire communications, while it might not have been a net
neutrality violation per se (as purportedly based on a generally applicable offering), demonstrates
what happens when emergency communications are consigned to an unregulated market without
common carrier protections. See RIFO Remand Order, supra note 95, at 12336–70 paras. 19–69.
The throttling of the Santa Clara Fire Department’s mutual aid communications equipment while
it was combatting the Mendocino Complex Fire (then the largest wildfire in California history) is
documented in emails. Declaration of Fire Chief Anthony Bowden in Support of Opposition to
Preliminary Injunction Motions, supra note 27, at 2, Ex. A. The June 29, 2018, emails of Fire Captain Justin Stockman describe Verizon’s earlier throttling of Fire Department electronic communications, after which Verizon assured the Department that it “had properly re-categorized the device
as truly ‘unlimited,’” which was how it had been sold (reflected in Deputy Chief Prziborowski’s
incorporated email). Id. at Ex. A.
Exhibit A contains a Verizon representative’s July 9, 2018 email, asserting “Verizon has
always reserved the right to limit data throughput on unlimited plans.” Id. After Stockman reports
continued throttling, Verizon responds that the Department will have to pay over twice the previous
rate in order to get the required data capacity (referenced as a special offer, for “Government Subscribers Only”) (July 30, 2018 email). Id.
The unreliable nature of Verizon’s quotes to the Fire Department appears not unique to
that company. See Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Emergency Disaster Relief Program,
Rulemaking 18-03-011, Modified Presiding Officer’s Decision Sanctioning AT&T California
(U1001C) and AT&T Corporation (U5002C) for Violations of Commission Rule 1.1, General Order 96-B, and Decision 19-08-025, Decision No. 20-08-037, slip op. at 1, 10, 18 (Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n Sept. 3, 2020) [hereinafter Decision Sanctioning AT&T], https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/Publ
ishedDocs/Published/G000/M346/K165/346165623.PDF [https://perma.cc/5Q5L-AQTG] (AT&T
assessed $3.75 million for misleading statements and failure to file legally and factually adequate
tariff descriptions for its Next Generation (NG) 911 broadband trunks; see also infra note 125 and
accompanying text).
122. Assemb. B. 1699, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.
gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB1699 [https://perma.cc/RA9U-KGW2] (including bill text, history, and committee bill analyses).
123. Id.; S. COMM. ON ENERGY, UTILS. & COMMC’NS, ANALYSIS OF A.B. 1699, 2019–2020
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
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of the emergency, subject to reasonable network management.124
The California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services’
(Cal OES’) development of a statewide Next Generation (NG) 911
system wholly based on broadband communications and Internet access also reflects state police power.125 Local jurisdictions, like Santa
Clara, have constructed their own emergency warning systems, which
rely in part on the state system; the Mozilla court referred to these as
“Internet-based services that depend on community members’ speedy
and unimpeded access to broadband Internet.”126 By virtue of AT&T
and other ISPs’ market dominance, Cal OES must contract with them
for broadband transport services.127 The ISPs objected to tariff requirements, however, claiming they are no longer bound to provide clear
tariff descriptions of their transport offerings (product description,
speeds, broken-out pricing), although historically required for 911
transport, because the broadband trunk service was now classified as
“interstate information service.”128 It was only the CPUC’s enforcement authority that compelled AT&T to provide this information.129
Programs that affect the safety and reliability of the energy grid
also depend on Internet access. In order to modernize the state’s electricity distribution system, California has invested in Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), an integrated array of IP-driven smart meters, IP communications networks, and data management systems that
enables two-way communications between utilities and customers.130
AMI, in turn, enables the energy utilities’ demand response programs,

124. Cal. Assemb. B. 1699.
125. Cal OES’ design for the NG 911 system is described at CA 9-1-1 Technology, CAL.
GOVERNOR’S OFF. EMERGENCY SERVS., https://caloes.ca.gov/cal-oes-divisions/public-safetycommunications/ca-9-1-1-emergency-communications-branch/ca-9-1-1-technology [https://perma
.cc/QE3W-7MGE], and in Decision Sanctioning AT&T, supra note 121, at 22–25.
126. Mozilla v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see also Declaration
of Fire Chief Anthony Bowden in Support of Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motions, supra
note 27, at 2 para. 5 (“County Fire relies upon Internet-based systems to provide crucial and timesensitive public safety services.”).
127. See Decision Sanctioning AT&T, supra note 121, at 26 n.52, 67 n.159, 73 n.177.
128. See id. at 11–13, 26–27 (summarizing AT&T’s claim that because broadband is an IPenabled service it falls outside of CPUC enforcement authority).
129. Id. at 81–84. For similar carrier objections, see supra note 13.
130. See OFF. OF ELEC. DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE AND CUSTOMER SYSTEMS: RESULTS FROM THE SMART
GRID INVESTMENT GRANT PROGRAM 13 (Sept. 2016), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
2016/12/f34/AMI%20Summary%20Report_09-26-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYT7-DZUJ] (smart
meters “leverage[] a variety of wired and wireless communications technologies”).
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which have become critical during heat waves that distressed the
state’s electric grid.131
Similarly, state water resources are measured, controlled, and
protected at crucial junctures by telemetry transmitted over broadband
Internet access.132 Earthquake and fire safety are also implicated.
PG&E, for example, has “implemented a ‘gas detection box that uses
readily available [GIS] platforms . . .’ in the wake of an earthquake to
‘quickly survey . . . damaged areas and identify and prioritize work to
address gas leaks,’” and supports remotely controlled fire detection
cameras.133
The “jurisdictionally interstate” broadband classification and
the deregulatory regime it seeks to protect cast a shadow over statedriven public safety measures that rely on broadband Internet access
as an operational component. Any ruling that broadband connectivity
is exclusively the province of the federal government would further
vitiate state efforts. As the D.C. Circuit’s Mozilla decision recognized,
the threat to public safety after RIFO, absent state intervention, is real:
[P]ublic safety officials explained at some length how allowing broadband providers to prioritize Internet traffic as they
see fit, or to demand payment for top-rate speed, could imperil the ability of first responders, providers of critical
131. Christian Roselund, The California Blackout that Wasn’t, RMI (June 28, 2021),
https://rmi.org/the-california-blackout-that-wasnt/ [https://perma.cc/D6LE-WCMJ] (“demand response played [a] role[] in keeping the lights—and AC—on in California”); see Application of
Southern California Edison Company (U338E) for Approval of Its Energy Savings Assistance and
California Alternate Rates for Energy Programs and Budgets for Program Years 2015-2017, Application 14-11-007, Decision on Large Investor-Owned Utilities’ California Alternate Rates for
Energy (Care) and Energy Savings Assistance (ESA) Program Applications, Decision 16-11-022,
slip op. at 314–15, (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Nov. 21, 2016) (“AMI technology was proposed by
the IOUs to ‘offer residential customers the unique opportunity to participate in [demand response] . . . .’”).
132. Order Instituting Rulemaking into Policies to Promote a Partnership Framework between
Energy Investor Owned Utilities and the Water Sector to Promote Water-Energy Nexus Programs,
Rulemaking 13-12-011, Decision Updating the Water Energy Nexus Cost Calculator, Proposing
Further Inquiry, and Next Steps, Decision No. 16-12-047, slip op. at 17 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Dec. 20, 2016), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M171/K495/171495551
.PDF [https://perma.cc/7GM9-PSXJ] (“Infrastructure and services to provide both voice and internet communications for data management, transportation, and analysis, including narrowband and
broadband signals, are critical to water and energy management, the use of resources, and public
safety.” (emphasis added)); Doug Dawson, Broadband and Water Systems, POTS AND PANS
(Mar. 17,
2021),
https://potsandpansbyccg.com/2021/03/17/broadband-and-water-systems/
[https://perma.cc/FY4U-98CM] (smart grid technology to improve water systems).
133. Mozilla v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1, 60–61 (D.C. Cir. 2019); cf. Fire Detection Cameras, FIRE SAFE MARIN, https://firesafemarin.org/remote-fire-detection-cameras
[https://perma.cc/Q8TK-GG6U] (online cameras used for fire prevention).
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infrastructure, and members of the public to communicate
during a crisis.
....
. . . “[E]ven if discriminatory practices might later be addressed on a post-hoc basis by entities like the Federal Trade
Commission,” the harm to the public “cannot be undone.”134
The D.C. Circuit remanded the issue back to the FCC, which
again found that market competition eliminates the need for regulatory
oversight, even on safety issues.135
B. The Barely Explicable Fear of Talking Plainly About BIAS as an
Intrastate Service
In each of the instances described above, the problem and the
remedy are located primarily in the local access network. But, like
California’s defense of its net neutrality statute, most of the discourse
on the subject accepts (generally without question) the categorization
of broadband and broadband Internet access as “jurisdictionally interstate,” sometimes with a wink and a nod to the fact that “jurisdictionally interstate” may not actually mean interstate.136
1. The “Jurisdictionally Interstate” Categorization of BIAS—History
of a Fiction
As described below, the premise that BIAS is “jurisdictionally
interstate” has its genesis in a 1986 Supreme Court footnote, in a decision having nothing to do with broadband. Yet broadband’s interstate classification—whether in the telecommunications or information service category137—has become the cornerstone of FCC
claims to primacy in all things broadband-related.
The interstate-intrastate polarity is set forth in two sections of
the Communications Act. Section 152(a) provides that its provisions
“shall apply to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or
radio and all interstate and foreign transmission of energy by radio,
which originates and/or is received within the United States.”138
134. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 60–61 (second alteration in original) (quoting from Joint Appendix).
135. RIFO Remand Order, supra note 95, at 12329 para. 2, 12348–69 paras. 37–67.
136. See discussion infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.4.
137. The 2015 Open Internet Order, while classifying BIAS as a telecommunications service,
added that it was “jurisdictionally interstate.” Open Internet Order, supra note 12, at 5803–04,
paras. 431–33; see infra note 147 and accompanying text.
138. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
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Section 152(b) declares that intrastate communications services, like those delivered over a local access network, are the province of the states: “nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply
or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to . . . charges,
classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in
connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of
any carrier.”139
Congress made no separate category for traffic that might turn
out to be hybrid.140
In 1986, a decade before the 1996 Act, the Supreme Court confronted the intrastate-interstate distinction in Louisiana Public Service
Commission v. Federal Communications Commission,141 a case about
the proper allocation of depreciation in joint plant (facilities used for
both types of traffic).142 The Court held that the FCC (and industry)
could distinguish between interstate and intrastate service and plant
(as discussed in the following Section).143 But it dropped a footnote to
address cases cited by the FCC that found it impossible to separate
intrastate from interstate telecommunications: “[C]ases [finding separation was possible] are readily distinguishable from those in which
FCC pre-emption of state regulation was upheld where it was not possible to separate the interstate and the intrastate components of the asserted FCC regulation.”144
From this one sentence of dicta in a footnote was born the “impossibility exception” on which the legal fiction of “jurisdictionally
interstate” is based.145 While this case involved not broadband but legacy telephone service, the FCC has adopted, adapted, and applied this
principle to broadband Internet access ever since.
By the time of the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order, the impossibility exception had become accepted orthodoxy. The FCC used
139. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (emphasis added).
140. It now appears to be universally accepted that online packet flow is de facto a combination
of interstate and intrastate traffic. See infra Section III.B.2.
141. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
142. Id. at 375.
143. Id.
144. Id. at n.4 (citing N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976); N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 552
F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977)) (emphasis in original).
145. See, e.g., Mozilla v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Although
Louisiana PSC was decided ten years before the 1996 Act was adopted, the Act made no substantive changes to 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)’s reservation of state authority for intrastate service. See 47
U.S.C. § 152(b) (2018).
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it to preempt any “inconsistent” state regulation, even while recognizing that BIAS is in fact a “mixed-jurisdiction” service:
Today, we reaffirm the Commission’s longstanding conclusion that broadband Internet access service is jurisdictionally
interstate for regulatory purposes. As a general matter,
mixed-jurisdiction services are typically subject to dual federal/state jurisdiction, except where it is impossible or impractical to separate the service’s intrastate from interstate
components and the state regulation of the intrastate component interferes with valid federal rules or policies. With respect to broadband Internet access services, the Commission
has previously found that, “[a]lthough . . . broadband Internet access service traffic may include an intrastate component, . . . broadband Internet access service is properly considered
jurisdictionally
interstate
for
regulatory
purposes.” . . . The “Internet’s inherently global and open architecture” enables edge providers to serve content through
a multitude of distributed origination points, making end-toend jurisdictional analysis extremely difficult—if not impossible—when the services at issue involve the Internet.
....
. . . [W]e announce our firm intention to exercise our
preemption authority to preclude states from imposing obligations on broadband service that are inconsistent with the
carefully tailored regulatory scheme we adopt in this Order.146
The footnotes in these paragraphs document the FCC’s repeated resort to the “impossibility exception” to cement its jurisdictional supremacy, yet woven into the text is the admission that BIAS
is in fact a hybrid (“mixed-jurisdiction”) service, and that “impossibility” more likely means “impracticality.” There is no analysis of the
actual mix of traffic, why it is “impractical” or “impossible” to separate interstate from intrastate, or what policy goals are served by “impossibility.” One might speculate that this language represented a political concession rather than a policy judgment as FCC Chairman
Wheeler steered the contentious Order towards approval.

146. Open Internet Order, supra note 12, at 5803–04 paras. 431–33, 5803 nn.1275–80 (first
alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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The 2015 Open Internet Order was also incomplete in another
sense. While citing its 2004 decision in Vonage Holdings Corp. to
support the “impossibility” rationale, it omitted the distinction between “fixed” and “nomadic” VoIP services—those attached to a specific address and those not so locatable—and failed to mention that the
Commission had in the interim corrected itself.147 In its 2006 Universal Service Contribution Methodology decision (and elsewhere), the
FCC found that it was, in fact, possible to separate interstate from intrastate VoIP services, at least as to fixed (“interconnected”) VoIP:
[A]n interconnected VoIP provider with the capability to
track the jurisdictional confines of customer calls would no
longer qualify for the preemptive effects of our Vonage Order and would be subject to state regulation. This is because
the central rationale justifying preemption set forth in the
Vonage Order would no longer be applicable to such an interconnected VoIP provider.148
In its analysis of broadband as an interstate service, the Open
Internet Order also did not mention relevant dicta on appeal of the
Vonage Order in the Eighth Circuit, which in 2007 again anticipated
advances in mapping technology that by the time of the Open Internet
Order had come to pass: “Our review is limited to the issue whether
the FCC’s determination was reasonable based on the record existing
before it at the time. If, in the future, advances in technology undermine the central rationale of the FCC’s decision, its preemptive effect
may be reexamined.”149

147. Id. at 5803 n.1276 (citing Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling
Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 22404, 22419 para. 17 (2004) [hereinafter Vonage
Order], aff’d Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Minnesota PUC), 483 F.3d
570, 582–83 (8th Cir. 2007)). In his separate Concurring Statement, Chairman Michael Powell
seemed unaware of fixed VoIP, stating that “VoIP services are nomadic . . . making identification
of the end points of any given communications session completely impractical,” and therefore “unquestionably interstate.” Vonage Order, supra, at 22437. By 2006, this statement was no longer
tenable, and by 2015 the FCC’s citation to its 2004 Vonage Order was highly problematic. See
infra notes 148–149 and accompanying text.
148. Universal Service Contribution Methodology, WC Docket No. 06-122, Report and Order
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21 FCC Rcd. 7518, 7546 para. 56 (2006) (discussing Vonage
Order).
149. Minnesota PUC, 483 F.3d at 580. Three years later, with the growth of cable voice, there
had been “dramatic” growth “in fixed networks, with 31 million Americans subscribing to interconnected VoIP service in 2010,” making much of the online traffic geo-locatable. Universal Service Contribution Methodology, WC Docket No. 06-122, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
27 FCC Rcd. 5357, 5368–69 para. 18 (2012) [hereinafter Universal Service Contribution
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The Open Internet Order was also silent on how the FCC had,
in fact, been applying a “separations process” to VoIP traffic in order
to apportion universal service surcharges between interstate and intrastate jurisdictions (see following section).
Two years later, the administration in Washington D.C. had
changed, and in 2017 the “jurisdictionally interstate” classification
was re-functionalized to achieve precisely the opposite result. The
FCC used it not to defend rules it had promulgated but to protect the
absence of rules, and to preempt states from attempting to fill that vacuum.150
On appeal of the 2017 Order, the D.C. Circuit in Mozilla drolly
recited how the “jurisdictionally interstate” assumption traced back to
a then thirty-one-year-old footnote, and glossed the “impossibility exception” in a more practical vein:
All the impossibility exception does is help police the line
between those communications matters falling under the
Commission’s authority (Section 152(a)) and those remaining within the States’ wheelhouse (Section 152(b)). Specifically, if the matter involves interstate communications or a
mix of state and federal matters and it falls within the impossibility exception, then the Commission may regulate to the
extent of its statutory authority.151
In this telling, the “impossibility exception” is less a description of fact than a declaration of law and policy. Its acceptance, however, can lead to absurd results, including the reluctance to discuss the
network as a physical reality.152 The interstate assumption becomes “a

Methodology 2012], https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0501/FCC12-46A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DTH-B9PJ].
150. RIFO, supra note 2, at 426–32 paras. 194–204.
151. Mozilla v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
The court nevertheless adopted the “jurisdictionally interstate” categorization without further examining its underlying factual and policy assumptions. See id. at 78. The parties and amici in the
California litigation followed suit. See California Opposition, supra note 16, at 45–46; Brief of the
Chamber of Com. of the United States et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Renewed
Motions for Preliminary Injunctions at 11, Am. Cable Ass’n v. Becerra, No. 2:18-cv-02684 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 19, 2020) [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Amicus], https://www.eff.org/document/usa-v-ca-amicus-brief-chamber-commerce-et-al-support-motions-preliminary-injunctions
[https://perma.cc/44ZZ-FK9S].
152. See supra Section II.D.
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sort of Procrustean bed, to which [they] forcibly adapt [their] designs.”153
2. How Impossible Does “Impossibility” Have to Be?
The FCC’s repeated invocation of the “impossibility exception” notwithstanding, separating interstate from intrastate traffic is
not something new; it has been done since before the inception of the
Communications Act.154
In 1976, at the dawn of the broadband era, the D.C. Circuit
batted away the FCC’s claim that it would be too difficult to separate
interstate from intrastate traffic of cable companies:
The allocation of regulatory duties along the lines of interversus intrastate activities is a problem with which the Commission and state agencies must frequently deal, and have
dealt successfully. Nor can the involvement of cable operators with more than one regulatory body logically be the
cause of the alleged unworkability, for the Commission itself
has recognized the role of local authorities in granting franchises and rights of way for the cables used.155
Nor was there any sudden break or sharp distinction between
the legacy telephone network and the IP networks of today—both run
in large part over the same wires and plant. Dynamic routing, usually
associated with IP traffic, has been used in both the public-switched

153. Edgar Allan Poe, The Purloined Letter, POESTORIES.COM, https://poestories.com/read/purloined [https://perma.cc/5DKE-YS5T]. Procrustes was a rogue smith and bandit
who invited people to stay in his iron bed, and then stretched them or cut off their legs to fit the
size of the bed. Procrustes, BRITANNICA (Jan. 4, 2011), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Procrustes [https://perma.cc/P2J6-5ZE3]; Commentary, The Lesson of Procrustes, POWER (Nov. 1,
2011), https://www.powermag.com/the-lesson-of-procrustes/ [https://perma.cc/XB4H-DNSF].
154. See Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 148–52 (1930) (requiring the trial court to
apportion joint-use telecommunications facilities between intrastate and interstate use). This case
is generally understood as the genesis of a separations requirement in telecommunications law. See
Nadler, supra note 3, at 468 n.50.
155. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601, 614 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); see also id. at n.80 (“In reference to the significant local role provided under the Commission’s regulations, . . . [t]he Commission has stated its intention to create ‘a cohesive, cooperative program between federal and local authorities.’” (first citing Amendments of Part 76 of the
Commission’s Rules and Regulations, Docket Nos. 20018–24, Clarification of the Cable Television
Rules and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Inquiry, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, 188 para. 41 (1974); and
then citing Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 339 (1974) (reinforcing
the role of state and local governments in providing “permits or franchises . . . including rights of
way for the cables used”))).
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telephone network (PSTN) and in currently operating broadband networks:
Dynamic routing increases the capacity of the network by
spreading load along popular links to less utilized pathways . . . [and] is a basic functionality that is an integral part
of the system’s structure.
Though the PSTN was originally constructed with fixed
routes, dynamic routing was added in the 1980s to reduce
network congestion. . . . With the growth of Voice over IP
(VoIP), interchange between the Internet and the PSTN further blurred the line between the two.156
The Supreme Court in Louisiana PSC ultimately rejected “impossibility,” notwithstanding its “impossibility” footnote four. In the
text to which footnote four was appended, the Court emphasized the
requirement to attempt separation even when it is difficult,157 and
pointed to solutions built into the Act:
The Communications Act not only establishes dual state and
federal regulation of telephone service; it also recognizes that
jurisdictional tensions may arise as a result of the fact that
interstate and intrastate service are provided by a single integrated system. Thus, the Act itself establishes a process designed to resolve what is known as “jurisdictional separations” matters . . . . Because the separations process literally
separates costs such as taxes and operating expenses between
interstate and intrastate service, it facilitates the creation or
recognition of distinct spheres of regulation.158
Today, a “Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service” facilitates the separations process necessary to apportion state and federal universal service contributions.159 Traffic studies are one method
sanctioned by the Board to separate interstate from intrastate traffic
and revenue.160
156. Joint Technologists’ Comments, supra note 24, at 10–11.
157. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 476 U.S. 355, 375 (1986) (“[W]e
reject the intimation—the position is not strongly pressed—that the FCC cannot help but pre-empt
state depreciation regulation of joint plant.”).
158. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(c), 410(c) (2018)).
159. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/general/federal-state-joint-board-universal-service [https://perma.cc/2DFEAHCH] (last updated Jan. 6, 2021).
160. Carriers are required to provide precise inter/intrastate breakdowns, based on books and
records, where possible. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, 2020 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTING

(8) 55.1_WITTEMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

NET NEUTRALITY FROM THE GROUND UP

2/16/22 4:43 PM

107

Nor is it impossible to track IP traffic. Although it seems that
IP packets whiz around the world subject to some unknown algorithm,
it is possible to trace packets, geolocate endpoints, and better understand the actual intrastate/interstate balance of broadband telecommunications traffic.161 Similar to voice calls transmitted with calling and
called party information, each IP packet contains “source and destination IP addresses.”162 In fact, the FCC has collected numerous voice
over IP traffic studies,163 suggesting that 75–80 percent of this traffic
is intrastate.164
Additionally, content providers are increasingly using content
distribution networks (CDNs) to move content closer to ISP head ends

WORKSHEET INSTRUCTIONS (FCC FORM 499-A), at 39 (2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-20-164A3.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6SC-VJKR]. When a carrier claims this is impossible, it may use a “traffic study,” i.e., “statistical sampling to estimate the proportion of minutes
[traffic] that are interstate and international” as opposed to intrastate, or resort to a “safe harbor”
(weighted heavily toward interstate). Id. at 40–42.
161. See John Markoff, Scientists Strive to Map the Shape-Shifting Net, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/science/02topo.html [https://perma.cc/F8WT-6DLP]
(“[T]he majority of Internet traffic . . . flows directly between large content providers like Google
and consumer networks like Comcast.”). Geolocation is clearly not an issue with most wireless
broadband access, as any user of Google Maps can attest. See also TRACEROUTE, http://traceroute.org [https://perma.cc/W2Y8-RGWT] (traceroute aggregation site); CAIDA, www.caida.org
[https://perma.cc/VG6M-SVJ8] (the extensive data mapping done by UCSD’s Center for Applied
Internet Data Analysis); Ben Du et al., RIPE IPmap Active Geolocation: Mechanism and Performance Evaluation, 50 COMPUT. COMMC’N REV. 3 passim (2020) (also discussing commercially
available geolocation services NetAcuity and GeoIP2). While carriers have this data, researchers
and regulators will not have it absent government intervention. See Scott Jordan, Measurement to
Inform Policy: Who Should Do It?, CTR. APPLIED INTERNET DATA ANALYSIS,
https://www.caida.org/workshops/wombir/2101/slides/wombir2021-paper19.pdf [https://perma.cc
/HZ6U-RTHM] (ISPs, transit providers, and content providers have access to traffic data); David
Clark & kc claffy, Trust Zones: A Path to a More Secure Internet Infrastructure (Nov. 2020) (working draft), https://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2021/trust_zones/trust_zones.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C5EP-F7VM].
162. Jordan Declaration, supra note 27, at paras. 11–13 (“Each broadband provider assigns an
IP address to each of its customers’ modems (e.g., cable modem, DSL modem, or smartphone) . . . .
The routers and other network equipment used by broadband providers examine the destination IP
address of each packet in order to determine where to route that packet.”).
163. Universal Service Contribution Methodology 2012, supra note 149, at 5409 n.254 (“VoIP
[Voice over Internet Protocol] providers that file traffic studies on average report 21.5 percent interstate/international revenues . . . .”).
164. See id. at 5406 para. 125:
VoIP providers have filed traffic studies showing interstate/international revenues
ranging from zero to 59.9 percent. Forty-seven out of 243 VoIP providers have submitted
traffic studies showing no interstate/international traffic. Overall, the average percentage
for VoIP traffic studies is 22.1 percent interstate/international, with the median study
reporting 14.7 percent interstate/international. Traffic studies on file thus report interstate/international usage significantly lower than the safe harbors for both wireless and
interconnected VoIP.
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and central offices, further tipping the balance of traffic in the intrastate direction even in the era of “global” networks.165
The FCC and the courts occasionally recognize the hybrid intrastate/interstate nature of online traffic flow. “The FCC found that it
had previously erred by trying to rigidly classify ISP-bound traffic as
either local or long-distance for the purposes of [intercarrier compensation], and the Commission should instead have recognized that such
traffic is a hybrid.”166 Still, the jurisdictionally interstate fiction remains (as of this writing) the dominant paradigm.
3. Mapping the “End-to-End” Network Is Not Impossible
A final line of defense for the “jurisdictionally interstate” classification is the “end-to-end” meme. It is a phrase with different meanings, depending on context. For regulatory lawyers it seems to connote
the Internet as a global network with inherently unknowable endpoints; for engineers, it means something else.
The Open Internet Order used it in the former sense: “The ‘Internet’s inherently global and open architecture’ enables edge providers to serve content through a multitude of distributed origination
points, making end-to-end jurisdictional analysis extremely difficult—if not impossible—when the services at issue involve the Internet.”167 RIFO adopts this logic to bolster its own findings of
165. See, e.g., Joint Technologists’ Comments, supra note 24, at 2 (“global communication”);
id. at 13–15 (describing the evolution of CDNs from ISPs’ early creation of caches with a local
copy of their subscribers’ favorite content, shortening the distance between the requesting subscriber and the requested content, and how this business was taken over by third party CDN services
employed by content providers to move content close to the carrier/ISPs’ central office or head
end).
One of the Joint Technologists, Tim Pozar, adds:
Most medium to large content providers will use a Content Delivery Network (CDN) in
order to hand off content to customers. A CDN will have servers as close to the eyeballs
as possible. If you are in the [San Francisco] Bay Area, likely most of your content is
coming from servers in the South Bay hosted by folks like Amazon Web Services,
Cloudflare, etc. So if you are just looking at the connection from the eyeball to say Netflix, then that traffic is likely not only completely contained in California, but likely
doesn’t even leave the Bay Area.
E-mail from Tim Pozar, Co-Founder, Two P, to author (Jan. 29, 2021, 6:41 PM) (on file with author). An East Coast advocate points out that intrastate traffic might be less predominant in smaller
states: “[H]ere in [D.C.] I might take the same device and even the same session with me across
not one [but] two different state lines in just a few minutes . . . passing from Maryland into [D.C.]
and then across the river to Virginia.” E-mail from Matt Wood, Vice President of Pol’y & Gen.
Counsel, Free Press, to author (Feb. 12, 2021, 4:58 PM) (on file with author).
166. AT&T Corp. v. Core Commc’ns, Inc (AT&T v. Core), 806 F.3d 715, 721 & n.30 (3d Cir.
2015).
167. Open Internet Order, supra note 12, at 5803 para. 431.
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impossibility and interstate jurisdiction, citing the same “end-to-end”
passage of the Commission’s earlier Cable Modem Order.168 The latter
devoted all of three sentences to the matter, concluding that “[t]he jurisdictional analysis rests on an end-to-end analysis, in this case on an
examination of the location of the points among which cable modem
service communications travel.”169 Note the language is not “transmission, between or among points specified by the user,” the definition of
“telecommunications” in the 1996 Act.170
The other end-to-end precedent on which the Open Internet
Order ultimately relied is the 1998 GTE Order.171 The assumption in
the GTE Order was of one call to an ISP modem, with a second hop
beyond the modem into an “international network of interconnected
computers” with multiple (and potentially unknowable) termination
points.172 Today the two-hop model is largely a thing of the past; one
does not need a “dial-up” ISP because the ISP is itself the last-mile
provider of connectivity.173 Packets are sent from an end-user (subscriber) to a web address “specified by the user,” with both sender and
168. RIFO, supra note 2, at 429–30 para. 199 (citing Cable Modem Order, supra note 32, at
4832 para. 59). RIFO follows this with the unfounded assertion that BIAS is “predominantly interstate” based on carrier statements that a “substantial amount of Internet traffic begins and ends
across state lines.” Id. at 430 para. 199 & n.743. This in turn apparently references a previous but
largely abandoned “interstate” rationale that any traffic crossing a state line is ipso facto interstate,
even if it begins and ends in the same state. Nadler, supra note 3, at 489 n.167. But see Thrifty Call,
Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.; Tariff F.C.C.
No. 1, CCB/CPD File No. 01-17, Declaratory Ruling, 19 FCC Rcd. 22240, 22246–47 para. 15
(2004) (“The fact that the calls at issue were routed through a switch in Georgia is immaterial to
the jurisdiction of a call.”).
169. Cable Modem Order, supra note 32, at 4832 para. 59 (emphasis added).
170. 47 U.S.C. § 153(50) (2018) (emphasis added); see also Jordan Declaration, supra note 27,
at 4–5 paras. 11–12 (each network user has an IP address, and every email or other Internet transmission by that user contains packets with the IP address of the addressee, i.e., the user is effectively
specifying the end points of the transmission); see also id. at 3–4 para. 8 (illustrating the same
principle in the context of a Skype call).
171. Open Internet Order, supra note 12, at 5803 n.1275 (citing GTE Telephone Operating
Cos.; GTOC Tariff No. 1; GTOC Transmittal No. 1148, CC Docket No. 98-79, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 22466 (1998) [hereinafter GTE Order]).
172. GTE Order, supra note 171, at 22468 para. 5; see also Pac. Bell v. Pac-West Telecomm,
Inc., 325 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The FCC concluded that ISP traffic does not terminate
at an ISP’s modem, and should not be considered as comprising two distinct calls. . . . The FCC
instead used an ‘end-to-end’ analysis to conclude that, for jurisdictional purposes, ISP traffic was
substantially interstate.”).
173. Lee L. Selwyn & Helen E. Golding, Revisiting the Regulatory Status of Broadband Internet Access: A Policy Framework for Net Neutrality and an Open Competitive Internet, 63 FED.
COMMC’NS L.J. 91, 96 (2010) (“[S]ubscribers to the major ISPs were required to provide their own
‘last mile’ connection, usually accomplished on a dial-up basis utilizing the subscriber’s home (or
business) local telephone service. . . . [U]nlike today’s principal providers of broadband Internet
access, dial-up ISPs did not provide last-mile telecommunications services . . . .”).
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addressee known to the carrier, even if the stray intrastate packet is
“dynamically” routed out-of-state—in short, today’s traffic can be
mapped and measured.174
By contrast, engineers talk about end-to-end (“e2e”) as a design principle:
The e2e argument organizes the placement of functions
within a network. It counsels that the “intelligence” in a network should be located . . . at its “ends,” where users put information and applications onto the network. The communications protocols themselves (the “pipes” through which
information flows) should be as simple and as general as possible.175
This design reflected the original democratic vision of the web,
of a “dumb” or passive network carrying all applications and content
without discrimination,176 what Tim Wu first called “net neutrality.”177
It is not an argument for FCC hegemony in broadband policy.
Advocates can either argue about the actual intrastate/interstate ratio of that traffic, or admit that the precise ratio is irrelevant. If
this paper does nothing besides show that the “impossibility exception” and “jurisdictionally interstate” rubrics are, at root, constructs
that stand in for administrative convenience, policy, or political calculation rather than empirical fact, it will have accomplished its essential

174. Jordan Declaration, supra note 27, at 4–5 para. 12 (discussing the correlation between
geographical and Internet addresses); see also supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing
the extensive mapping done by San Diego’s Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis). Nadler’s
1995 article notes that carriers were even then acquiring the ability to track packets. Nadler, supra
note 3, at 502 (“If it is not here already, there will soon come a time when technology makes it
possible to determine the jurisdictional nature of any communication.”). See also supra notes 168,
173.
175. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture
of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 930–31 (2001) (citing the work of
pioneering Internet engineer J. H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUT. SYS. 277 (1984)).
176. Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 41
(2004). But see id. at 65 (objecting that engineers’ preference for “dumb” pipes with intelligence at
the network edge ignores the potential benefits of situating intelligence in the middle of the network, allowing “differentiation”).
177. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141 passim (2003). Although Wu first used the term “net neutrality” in this 2003 article,
he situated it as an “end-to-end” principle in a subsequent article. Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH
TECH. L. 15, 26 (2006) (“The essence of the end-to-end principle is that the most valuable network
is that which supports the broadest number of uses.”).
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purpose. The analysis then becomes about policy choices, discussed
in Sections III.C.4 and III.D below.
4. State and Local Jurisdiction over Access Networks Is Not
Inimical to Federal Framework Authority and Jurisdiction Over
Factually Interstate Network Elements
State oversight of local broadband networks does not mean
building firewalls between states or disentangling California’s broadband networks from those in other states—no more than the federal
financing and construction of a national highway system has precluded the California Highway Patrol from policing the interstate
highways in California. Nor is state jurisdiction over in-state infrastructure inimical to federal jurisdiction over factually interstate elements of the network, such as a good portions of the backbone and
long-haul interconnection market, and spectrum allocation.
We are not faced with a binary choice of one national framework or many state frameworks; national principles do not necessarily
have to oust state oversight. The 1996 Telecommunications Act, for
example, set out principles for the unbundling and joint use of local
network elements, which the states were then to apply and enforce (a
reasonable plan primarily defeated by industry challenges).178
Even when the interstate classification is accepted, courts have
found ways to conclude that it does not necessarily exclude state jurisdiction. As the Third Circuit held in AT&T Corp. v. Core Communications, Inc.179: “[T]he jurisdictional determination reflects only a
finding about the Commission’s power to regulate under Section 201,
not a view that its jurisdiction is exclusive. . . . The [Commission’s]
analysis established the FCC’s power, but did not restrict or even address competing power from the states.”180 The Court pointed to the
fact that the FCC has two doctrines that can apply in this circumstance—“jurisdictionally interstate” and “jurisdictionally mixed”—
and that the FCC itself does not always clearly distinguish between
them:
178. See generally infra note 235 (describing incumbents’ challenges to unbundling and subsequent legal battles).
179. AT&T Corp. v. Core Commc’ns, Inc (AT&T v. Core), 806 F.3d 715 (3d Cir. 2015).
180. Id. at 726 (citing Glob. NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 444 F.3d 59, 71 (1st
Cir. 2006)); see also 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2018) (“It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged
in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon
reasonable request therefor.”).
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By using the terms “interstate” and “jurisdictionally mixed”
interchangeably in the ISP Remand Order, the FCC demonstrated that it could not have been ruling about exclusive jurisdiction. Based on the traditional understanding of the
terms, purely interstate traffic is exclusively committed to the
FCC, and jurisdictionally mixed traffic is subject to “dual
federal/state jurisdiction.” If the FCC believed the [1996 Act]
committed ISP-bound traffic to its exclusive jurisdiction, it
would have distinguished between the two.181
When the interstate and intrastate components are in fact inseparable, “state jurisdiction over mixed use services such as ISPbound local traffic is tied to conflict preemption.”182 Four years later,
the Court in Mozilla endorsed this approach, redefining the “impossibility exception” as a “protect[ion of] a valid federal regulatory objective,” but not wholly abandoning alleged impossibility as a rationale
to regulate intrastate communications, i.e., where “interstate aspects
of the matter cannot be ‘unbundled’ from regulation of the intrastate
aspects.”183 This begs the questions of what would be needed to show
that “aspects” cannot be unbundled, and what would in fact constitute
a conflict. Every road in California feeds into highways that are part
of an interstate system; this does not oust California from jurisdiction
over (for example) public safety on those roads.184
What an empirically rooted jurisdictional scheme would rule
out is exclusive federal jurisdiction over network elements that are demonstrably local or intrastate.
The states could take a whistle-past-the-graveyard approach
and hope that recognition of “mixed jurisdiction rules would not preclude states from enforcing requirements similar to those the Commission acknowledged as necessary to carry out the federal regime.”185
181. AT&T v. Core, 806 F.3d at 726–27 (footnote omitted).
182. Id. at 727 (citing La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 476 U.S. 355, 360
(1986)) (“A state is . . . preempted and lacking jurisdiction to regulate ISP-bound local traffic if and
only if the state regulation conflicts with federal law.”).
183. Mozilla v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of Md. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 909 F.2d 1510, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
184. See generally Narechania & Stallman, supra note 9, at 605–06 (“[T]he case for an exclusive federal role over broadband carriage is weak . . . in view of concerns for concentration in local
access markets . . . [and] the power of local broadband carriers to intermediate a relationship between . . . out-of-state [content] providers and local customers . . . .”).
185. See Lyons, supra note 45, at 939 (citing National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners Petition for Clarification or Declaratory Ruling that No FCC Order or Rule Limits State
Authority to Collect Broadband Data, WC Docket No. 09-193, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
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This is an inherently unsatisfactory approach, however, as it does not
recognize states as coequal partners with shared jurisdiction over a
hybrid system, much less the primacy of states and local governments
in matters involving local and last-mile networks.186 For instance,
could states impose higher resiliency standards in specified high fire
threat areas? Could states enforce net neutrality rules as part of their
traditional consumer protection functions? What about the “zero-rating” and interconnection provisions found in SB 822 but not in federal
law?187 Would the FCC share data with the states, subject to a coordinated confidentiality regime?188
Balancing federal and state interests going forward is further
discussed in Section III.D below.
C. The Physical and Economic Reality of Local Access Networks—a
Closer Look
Having established that broadband carries a mix of interstate
and intrastate traffic, and that it is possible to tease them apart when
needed, let us return to where we started, the physical reality of local
access facilities. Here the bottleneck, and the need for regulation, is
patent.
1. Preface: Regulatory Arbitrage—Are We Regulating the Service,
the Infrastructure, or the Corporate Entity, and Does It Matter?
Some might object that the following discussion of physical
network facilities is misplaced because SB 822 and other net neutrality
rules regulate the service rather than the infrastructure (or the corporate entity). They might claim broadband access is a deregulated information service, even if the infrastructure on which it rides is regulated. This argument allows carriers continued access to rights-of-way,
infrastructure, and state dispute resolution mechanisms (often through

25 FCC Rcd. 5051, 5054–55 para. 9 (2010) (“Classifying broadband Internet access service as an
information service or finding that this service is jurisdictionally interstate, however, does not by
itself preclude mandatory State data-gathering efforts.”)).
186. See infra notes 232 and 243 and accompanying text discussing “cooperative federalism”;
see also supra Sections III.A.2, III.A.3; infra Sections III.C.2–.4 (state police powers and regulation
of local networks).
187. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3101(a)(9) (2021); id. § 3101(a)(3); Lyons, supra note 45, at 927–
28; supra note 49; infra Section III.D.
188. As discussed below, data sharing (or rather the lack of it) has been one of the pain points
in “cooperative federalism.” See, e.g., infra notes 276 and 283 and accompanying text (states’ attempts to gain access to information FCC has from the carriers).
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separate affiliates), and eligibility for infrastructure deployment subsidies, while (arguably) shielding them from regulation of the services
running on those facilities.189
A high-stakes game of regulatory arbitrage ensues, playing off
the balkanized regulatory categories of traditional telephone, VoIP telephony, cable television, and broadband—all of which flow over the
same infrastructure.190 The semantic trick in preserving “light touch”
(or no touch) regulation seems to be isolating service regulation from
facilities regulation.
The FCC, in its post-Mozilla Order on Remand, demonstrates
how this is done. After declaring in RIFO that broadband was no
longer a telecommunications service, commenters pointed out that
broadband providers would then no longer be eligible for access to
poles and conduit under 47 U.S.C. § 224, as that statute is limited to
telecommunications and cable television providers, neither of which
statutorily encompasses broadband.191 The D.C. Circuit remanded this
issue to the FCC.192 On remand the FCC solved the problem by finding
that if an entity offered “cable or telecommunications services over
the same network,” it could bootstrap its broadband traffic into those
categories.193

189. For example, in Rulemaking 20-09-001 In re Broadband Infrastructure Deployment,
Frontier and other carriers warn that “[w]hile the Commission has a role in fostering the deployment
of broadband facilities, it does not regulate broadband services.” Frontier California Inc. Opening
Comments, supra note 44, at 3; see also supra note 13 (broadband carriers’ objections to CPUC
jurisdiction based on classification of broadband access as an “interstate” and/or “information”
service).
190. As used herein, “infrastructure” means the physical facilities on which the network runs,
what some have called the “physical layer.” See discussion of the physical layer supra note 25 and
accompanying text; infra note 200. Narechania and Stallman also emphasize the “shared infrastructure” theme, beginning with inside wiring and moving out to local access networks. Narechania &
Stallman, supra note 9, at 550–52, 562, 616 (“[C]ommunications infrastructure remains much the
same: Internet data now runs through the wires that were once dedicated to telephone calls.”).
191. Mozilla v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Communications Act defines the ‘pole attachment[s]’ it subjects to regulation by reference to ‘telecommunications service[s]’ under Title II [and cable television services under Title III], not information
services under Title I. 47 U.S.C.§ 224(a)(4).” (second and third alterations in original))
192. Id. at 65–67.
193. RIFO Remand Order, supra note 95, at 12370–72 paras. 72–73 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 339 (2002)) (“‘[W]here the same infrastructure
would provide “both telecommunications and wireless broadband Internet access service,” the provisions of section 224 governing pole attachments would continue to apply to such infrastructure
used to provide both types of service.’ . . . [A] majority of subscribers are served by ISPs that provide either cable or telecommunications services over their networks and therefore remain able to
take advantage of the rights guaranteed by section 224 after the reclassification of broadband Internet access service as an information service.”).
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State commissions follow suit,194 giving utility certifications
to companies whose primary business is clearly broadband,195 and allowing wireless carriers to attach to poles even though their traffic is
increasingly broadband.196 Similarly, cable companies that need telecommunications carrier status to obtain upstream interconnection with
other carriers regularly create telecommunications affiliates for that
purpose, while offering their VoIP or broadband service through separate “IP” affiliates they claim to be unregulated.197

194. Although the CPUC has itself relied on similar logic in the past, the CPUC was one of the
petitioners that challenged RIFO on pole and safety issues. Mozilla, 940 F.3d at 60.
195. See Application of Golden Bear Broadband, LLC for a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity in Order to Provide Full Facilities-Based and Resold Competitive Local Exchange
Services, Application 13-01-007, Decision Granting Golden Bear Broadband, LLC a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity in Order to Provide Full-Facilities Based and Resold Competitive Local Exchange Service, Decision No. 14-02-001, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Feb. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Application of Golden Bear Broadband], https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/Publis
hedDocs/Published/G000/M087/K885/87885070.PDF [https://perma.cc/A3ZA-6SCR]. The Commission granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Golden Bear Broadband, notwithstanding a then-existing ban on any CPUC regulation of “IP enabled services,” based on the
applicant’s assertion that it might offer “non-IP enabled special access” service if “required by some
customers,” with no further discussion of what this “broadband” company’s core business would
be. Id.
196. See Poles and Conduit Proceeding, supra note 109; Decision Amending the Right-of-Way
Rules to Apply to Wireless Telecommunications Facilities Installed by Competitive Local Exchange Carriers, Decision 18-04-007, slip op. at 34–35 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 27, 2018)
[hereinafter Decision Amending the Right-of-Way Rules], https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs
/Published/G000/M213/K609/213609261.PDF [https://perma.cc/Y45W-8MJG]. This decision was
a de facto attempt to address the rights of broadband providers to access utility poles, although the
Commission appeared loathe to state that explicitly. Compare id. at 2 (amending pole attachment
rules to “encourage widespread deployment of broadband wireless services”), with the Decision’s
Conclusions of Law:
CLEC wireless telecommunications facilities may be used to provide services (e.g.,
wireless broadband service) besides the telecommunications services that CLECs may
provide pursuant to their Commission-issued CPCNs.
CLECs’ nondiscriminatory access to public utility infrastructure under the ROW
Rules is limited to facilities that are necessary or useful for the provision of the telecommunications services that CLECs may provide pursuant to their Commission-issued
CPCNs. The ROW Rules do not apply to facilities that are wholly unrelated to the provision of such telecommunications services.
Id. at 34–35 (Conclusions of Law 2 and 3).
197. See Investigation on the Commission’s Own Motion into the Operations, Practices, and
Conduct of Comcast Phone of California, LLC (U-5698-C) and its Related Entities (Collectively
“Comcast”) to Determine Whether Comcast Violated the Laws, Rules, and Regulations of this State
in the Unauthorized Disclosure and Publication of Comcast Subscribers’ Unlisted Names, Telephone Numbers, and Addresses, Investigation No. 13-10-003, Order Instituting Investigation into
the Unauthorized Disclosure and Publication of Unlisted Telephone Numbers by Comcast, slip op.
at 4, (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Oct. 8, 2013), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/
G000/M078/K432/78432340.PDF [https://perma.cc/N4H3-QMHY]. In investigating Comcast’s
leak of over 75,000 unlisted customer names, addresses, and phone numbers onto the Internet, the
CPUC found that:
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The use of separate affiliates for service provision and infrastructure access reflects a separation of service from infrastructure,
what might be called the de-corporealization of the network. Contrary
to popular belief, the Internet does not exist in a “cloud,”198 but on
wires connecting computers, with Internet addresses that can most often be associated with real places on a map.199
Obviously, there is a continuity (and continuum) between infrastructure and service, just as there is a connection between the physical and IP layers in the protocol stack. Those who object that online
differentiation and discrimination happens at the IP layer and not the
physical layer ignore what Richard Whitt calls “lower layer control”—
whoever controls the physical/infrastructure layer can exert control up
through the protocol stack.200
SB 822 defines “Broadband Internet access service” as a service “that provides the capability to transmit data to, and receive data
from, all or substantially all Internet endpoints.”201 In other words, the
service—at its core—is connectivity and transport, neither of which
exists without a physical network.202
BIAS regulation is regulation of that connectivity and
transport, i.e., the operation of the wires or local radio access

Comcast Phone of California, LLC (“Comcast Phone”) holds a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN), U-5698-C . . . . According to Comcast, Comcast Phone
is primarily a wholesale provider offering interconnection and other regulated services,
of which Comcast IP Phone II, LLC [sic] (“Comcast IP”) receives through an interconnection agreement with Comcast Phone.
Id.
198. The “cloud” rhetoric of the Internet’s earlier days has now been supplanted by “software
defined networks” and “infrastructure as a service,” terms which similarly obscure the fact that
underlying networks and their infrastructure exist somewhere in the real world. See, e.g., FCC
TECH. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 120, at 33 (describing “cloud infrastructure such as IaaS
(Infrastructure as a Service)” (emphasis added)).
199. See Jordan Declaration, supra note 27, at 5 para. 12 (“[C]onsecutive IP addresses are clustered together geographically, and [that means] that the range of IP addresses assigned within one
access network does not overlap with the range of IP addresses assigned within another access
network. Thus, a broadband provider can easily identify the geographical location of an IP address . . . .”).
200. Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 587, 647
(2004) (“[A]n entity’s control over unique elements of the Physical Layer and its resulting control
over higher layers in the protocol stack . . . [and leads to a situation where] he who controls the
lower layers also can control the dependent upper layers.”).
201. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3100(b) (2021) (emphasis added).
202. S.B. 822 separately defines the “[c]ontent, applications, or services” that flow over that
connection as “edge services,” whereas net neutrality’s central concern is what happens on the
network. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3100(d), with § 3100(e).
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network.203 In that regard, net neutrality is little different than other
regulation of local infrastructure which has been the focus of state utility commissions for over a century.204 The neutrality, safety, and service quality rules described in this Article address a continuum of infrastructure operation.205
2. Monopoly/Duopoly Control, from the Ground Up
a. Claims—the market will provide
Opponents of neutrality laws claim they are unnecessary because competition will discipline the market. Congress wrote support
for this claim into the U.S. Code in 1996 (however ambiguously): “It
is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”206 Conflating transport and computer services, the ISPs and their
supporting amici cite this section to argue that “competitive pressures
in the market for Internet traffic exchange . . . undermine the need for
regulatory oversight.”207 “[A]llowing market forces to discipline this
emerging and competitive market is the better course.”208 These are

203. See, e.g., Open Internet Order, supra note 12, at 5609–10 paras. 21–22.
204. See NICK ZANJANI, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION: EXAMINING THE PAST TO HELP SHAPE THE FUTURE 21–22
(Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/files/uploadedfiles/cpuc_public_
website/content/about_us/history/abriefhistoryofthecaliforniapublicutilitiescommission8152014fi
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FSA-JELE].
205. See infra Section III.C.4. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2018) (confirming the concatenation of service and infrastructure, reserving to the states “jurisdiction with respect to . . . charges,
classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication”).
206. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added). Neither “Internet” nor “interactive computer services” is defined in the Code. See 47 U.S.C. § 153. Precisely read, section 230(b)(2) refers only to
the “information services” as understood at the time of the 1996 Act (computing services “at the
end of the line”), see supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text, but the ISPs (and U.S. Department
of Justice) cited this section to support their claims that competition exists in the broadband access
market. See infra text accompanying following notes 207–208; see also John Blevins, The Use and
Abuse of “Light-Touch” Internet Regulation, 99 B.U. L. REV. 177, 201 (2019) (“Data services were
thus distinct—legally, technologically, and economically—from the physical access network itself.”).
207. E.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 65, at 13 para. 28, 17 para. 35 (quoting RIFO,
supra note 2, at 413 para. 170).
208. RIFO, supra note 2, at 411 para. 168; Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion, supra note 65, at 29
(“status quo is a well-functioning interstate marketplace for broadband in which the 2018 Order,
which protects Internet openness”). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al. concur that RIFO has
“fostered competition and innovation that better serves low-income consumers by reducing prices,”
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variations on the long-running theme that consumers will “vote with
their feet,” i.e., choose an ISP that provides reliable service quality and
does not block or throttle traffic.209
The problem with this theory, whether codified or not, is that
the envisioned competition simply does not exist. In most instances,
the consumer cannot walk across the street (or pick up the phone) and
choose a comparable broadband alternative.210 The 1996 Telecommunication Act’s promise of facilities-based competition always had an
air of wish-fulfillment about it; it has never been fully realized (and,
given the tendency of delivery infrastructure towards monopoly, likely
never will).211 Wireless 5G service is touted as a solution to this, but
it—like all wireless networks—relies on a wired substrate that the incumbent wireline providers still largely control (one reason their affiliates remain the largest providers of wireless services). For this reason
among others, the CPUC found in 2016 that wireless broadband was
not a substitute for wireline broadband.212
California’s defense acknowledges that the hoped-for competitive environment has not materialized and has not prevented harmful
practices; it does not discuss the historical role of states, usually state
utility commissions, in addressing this lack of competition.213

which has provided “competitive constraints on practices such as blocking and throttling.” Chamber of Commerce Amicus, supra note 151, at 6, 8.
209. See Sherry Lichtenberg, Evaluating Telecommunications Service Quality: Can Consumers
Really “Vote with Their Feet” or Do We Need Regulatory Oversight?, NAT’L REGUL. RSCH. INST.
6–7 (Feb. 10, 2011), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/FA865CC1-A6CD-B84C-6F2E-D79ECDE4045B
[https://perma.cc/JL2N-HDVH].
210. See infra Section III.C.2.b (market dominance of incumbent carriers).
211. The 1996 Act envisioned a “ladder of investment,” whereby competitors could start by
reselling the incumbent’s product, then combine “unbundled network elements” from the incumbent’s network with the new entrant’s own elements to create a unified service offering, allowing
the new entrant to gradually build up its infrastructure, finally graduating to a stand-alone facilitiesbased network. Cf. Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its
Purpose? Empirical Evidence from Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 173, 176–77,
244–45 (2005) (describing “four major rationales for mandatory unbundling” including “enabl[ing]
future facilities-based investment (‘stepping-stone’ or ‘ladder of investment’ hypothesis)”). The
FCC declined to impose unbundling obligations on cable, fiber, or wireless networks. And even as
to the legacy wired networks, the network sharing provisions were slowly peeled back. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 359 F.3d 554, 578–85 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (reversing the
FCC’s unbundling program) (discussed in Rob Frieden, From Bad to Worse: Assessing the LongTerm Consequences of Four Controversial FCC Decisions, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 959, 993 (2012)).
212. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
213. California Opposition, supra note 16, at 2–4; see infra Section III.C.3 (describing states’
role as competition umpires).
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b. Metrics—what the data show
A comprehensive 2016 CPUC study found that California’s
broadband market was “highly concentrated.”214 Because this is
largely a last-mile (bottleneck) problem, one finds today only marginally more competition in last-mile broadband delivery than there was
in the legacy telephone network.215 In San Francisco and Oakland, relatively well-served urban centers, the CPUC found that Comcast and
AT&T provided 92 percent of the broadband lines in service to residences and small businesses (higher still if one includes the AT&T
loops resold by competitors like Sonic).216 As a practical matter there
is little or no choice for consumers, first responders, businesses, or
government agencies in the market for high-speed broadband Internet
access. For most, their choices are at best one of the duopoly broadband providers: the cable or telephone company.217
Measured by the industry standard HHI metric, 2016 market
concentration in the largest urban areas of California was, on average,
over twice what the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines as

214. Order Instituting Investigation into the State of Competition Among Telecommunications
Providers in California, and to Consider and Resolve Questions Raised in the Limited Rehearing
of Decision 08-09-042, Investigation 15-11-007, Decision Analyzing the California Telecommunications Market and Directing Staff to Continue Data Gathering, Monitoring and Reporting on the
Market, Decision No. 16-12-025, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 8, 2016),
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M171/K031/171031953.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/DSP8-MAW2]; see also Order Correcting Error, Decision No. 17-03-014, (Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n Mar. 8, 2017), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M176/
K505/176505969.PDF [https://perma.cc/USS5-JMFN] [collectively hereinafter Competition
Study]. This was (to the author’s knowledge) the first public, data-driven investigation of broadband
competition in California. It concluded that “[t]he residential high speed broadband market is highly
concentrated throughout California.” Id. at 3. The Competition Study agreed with the FCC’s earlier
finding that, as of 2016, most Americans had access to only one or no broadband provider at the
25/3 Mbps benchmark. Id. at 4, 93, 96.
215. See id. at 2–4. The CPUC’s Competition Study noted that legacy telephone and newer
broadband services “utilize the same physical network, a network that was largely developed for
legacy telephone service but now carries data and other Internet content as well,” a finding seconded by the Joint Technologists FCC filing. Id. at 3, 14, 187 (Finding of Fact 14); Joint Technologists’ Comments, supra note 24, at 10–11 (describing similarities between Internet and telephone
call routing).
216. See Competition Study, supra note 214, at 93–94. The carriers’ Form 477 subscription (as
opposed to deployment) data are key: “In the Oakland and San Francisco markets, all non-cable
competitive carriers [i.e., excluding AT&T] together provide less than 8% of total fixed broadband
lines.” Id.; see id. at 6 n.9, 169 n.429 (citing New Cingular Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1072
(N.D. Cal. 2016)) (incumbent providers’ attempt to limit access to subscription data).
217. See id. at 85. In certain urban areas, a third or even fourth provider is available—Sonic or
Monkeybrains in San Francisco, for instance—but even though these alternatives may be technically available, subscription data shows that they command a small fraction of the actually subscribed broadband lines in California. Id. at 82–83, 86–89.
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“highly concentrated.”218 A subsequent 2018 CPUC study confirmed
these results.219
Nor is wireless service an alternative. The CPUC study reported that no mobile provider in California consistently reached the
25/3 Mbps benchmark speed, that fixed wireless and satellite broadband services had an insufficient market share to remedy the lack of
competition, and that wireless technologies all rely on the wired network.220
c. Consequences—why competition matters
A concurrent CPUC study of network service quality illustrates how the ISPs’ market power limits consumer choice and lowers
the incumbents’ incentive to maintain the network.221 Where the last
mile is located in a low-income neighborhood, for instance, customers
are less likely to get a fiber upgrade: “those communities that AT&T
perceives as the most captive are afforded the lowest levels of attention by the company.”222

218. See id. at 93–94. The major urban markets in California range from a low HHI of 4881 in
Oakland, to a high of 5469 in San Jose—averaging over twice the “highly concentrated” benchmark. Id. HHI stands for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a primary tool used by the FTC to measure
competition. A score under 1500 indicates the market is contested, 1500–2500 reflects moderate
concentration, and any market scoring over 2500 is viewed as highly concentrated. See
HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index [https://perma.cc/9UGQ-JQAE]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 18–19 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R3G-2E8W].
219. LISA PRIGOZEN, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, RETAIL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN
CALIFORNIA 5 (Dec. 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/20210619170233/https://www.cpuc.ca.g
ov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/UtilitiesIndustries/Communications/Reports_and_Pres
entations/CD_Mgmt/re/CompetitionReportFinal%20Jan2019.pdf. The 2018 report did not, however, address the 2016 report’s description of the unreliability of carrier-reported deployment data.
See Competition Study, supra note 214, at 87, 91 n.244; see, e.g., Jon Brodkin, ISPs Don’t Want to
Tell the FCC Exactly Where They Offer Internet Service, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 12, 2017, 2:40 PM),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/isps-dont-want-to-tell-the-fcc-exactly-where-they-off
er-internet-service/ [https://perma.cc/29SN-25BV].
220. Competition Study, supra note 214, at 15, 18, 39, 60–61, 96.
221. NETWORK EXAM, supra note 108, at 1–2. The CPUC’s high level summary reflects:
1. Service Quality has deteriorated – Both carriers exhibited a higher relative number of
outages and longer time required to restore service for outages lasting more than 24
hours.
2. Demonstrated lack of resiliency – AT&T and Frontier are not maintaining networks
to withstand environmental and weather-related conditions. Networks are not robust,
both Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) have cut back on preventative maintenance expenditures.
Network Exam Summary, supra note 108.
222. NETWORK EXAM, supra note 108, at 521–22.
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The lack of competition in the last mile creates problems beyond poor service quality and a crisis of affordability.223 Apropos net
neutrality, two related problems are foremost. First, the consumer
faced with a service provider that distorts network traffic to its own
advantage cannot “vote with her feet” by going to the local big box
store and choosing another provider.
Second, competition can also be measured from the other end
of the pipe, i.e., from the perspective of the service or content provider
which must reach its customers through a sometimes hostile broadband access network. The ISP in this context has a “terminating access
monopoly” for that customer: there is no other way to reach her.224
The service/content producer is at the mercy of the conduit
owner. The conduit owner (ISP) is increasingly part of a vertically integrated corporation that offers both conduit (transport) and content
(e.g., video that competes with third party content providers like Netflix and Kanopy). AT&T, Verizon, and other legacy telephone companies have joined cable companies in purchasing and offering their

223. See id. at 3 (high level summary). The summary found a “[d]irect relationship between
amount of competition and service quality results[:] Areas with limited or no competition experience lower service quality results. Both AT&T and Frontier put more investment and attention in
areas with higher rates of competitive offerings.” Network Exam Summary, supra note 108.
224. Jordan Declaration, supra note 27, at 13 para. 42 (“[T]here is no path to or from a user
other than through the user’s broadband provider.”). California Declarant Kronenberg provides additional perspective:
The transit and backbone marketplace and [Content Delivery Network] marketplace are
more competitive than the last-mile BIAS marketplace—internet content (edge) providers generally have numerous choices to deliver their Internet traffic to large BIAS providers like AT&T and Comcast.
. . . In contrast, there is only one type of provider that transmits Internet traffic across
the BIAS provider’s network to its subscribers, and that is the BIAS provider itself. This
gives each BIAS provider exclusive control over access to its subscribers, often referred
in the industry as a “terminating access monopoly.”
Declaration of Angie Kronenberg, supra note 27, at 3 paras. 7–8.
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own video content225 as well as services such as home alarm systems.226
When conduit providers compete in adjacent content or service
markets, they enjoy an advantage that plainly creates a conflict of interest.227 In 2014, for instance, reports surfaced that Comcast was demanding payment from Netflix to deliver Netflix’s competing content
(delivery that end-users had paid for), after degrading the quality and
throttling the connection speeds of Netflix’s stream.228 Conversely,
conduit owners can offer consumers better terms and conditions for
their own content, including provisions that the ISP-affiliated programming will not count against the plans’ data caps, a practice known
as “zero-rating.”229 Opponents see this as akin to a railroad carrying
225. See Declaration of Laura Blum-Smith, supra note 27, at para. 8 (representing the Writers
Guild of America West, and describing the conduit providers’ advantages in the content market,
including the ability to “control what content reaches the public,” and “zero-rate” their own content). The CPUC’s Competition Study elaborated on the market power of conduit providers in adjacent markets:
AT&T has merged with DIRECTV, and has rights to or a stake in NFL Sunday Ticket,
ROOT SPORTS, The Tennis Channel, MLB Network, NHL Network, and GSN (Game
Show Network). . . . Verizon acquired AOL last year, and recently acquired a stake in
Awesomeness TV. . . . The AOL acquisition also includes stakes in content providers
like the Huffington Post, Engadget, and Techcrunch. . . . Verizon has also purchased another edge provider, Yahoo. See “Verizon to acquire Yahoo’s operating business,” available at http://www.verizon.com/about/news/verizon‐acquire‐yahoos‐operating‐business
(“Transaction will create a new rival in mobile media technology reaching over 1B users
with an unrivaled roster of the world’s most beloved brands.”). Indeed, even the fact that
a group like [Writers Guild], fairly unknown to CPUC proceedings at the time of URF,
is now a participant in our proceedings indicates the shift that has occurred.
Competition Study, supra note 214, at 24–25, 24 n.54 (citations omitted); see also BARBARA VAN
SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION 249, 236 (2010) (“A monopolist may
also use its monopoly over the primary good [BIAS in this case] to protect a monopoly in the
complementary market [e.g., video content] . . . . [A] monopolist will be able to capture some or
all of its rivals’ outside revenue in the complementary market by threatening exclusion . . . .”).
226. See generally Declaration of Thomas S. Nakatani (VP for IT and Monitoring Technology
at ADT), supra note 27 (describing instances when the conduit owner has interfered with ADT’s
alarm services).
227. See, e.g., VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 225, at 236 (“The monopolist can condition the ‘access’ of rivals’ complementary products and services on payment of an access fee . . . .”)
228. See, e.g., Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix to Pay Comcast for Smoother Streaming, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2014, 7:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/netflix-agrees-to-pay-comcast-toimprove-its-streaming-1393175346 [https://perma.cc/B379-EVTX]; Harold Feld, Of CDNs, Netflix, Net Neutrality, and Cable Fu#$@!ery, WETMACHINE (June 25, 2014, 7:57 AM),
https://wetmachine.com/tales-of-the-sausage-factory/of-cdns-netflix-net-neutrality-and-cablefuery/ [https://perma.cc/BET9-RA8T]. But see Jonathan E. Nuechterlein and Christopher S. Yoo,
A Market-Oriented Analysis of the “Terminating Access Monopoly” Concept, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J.
21, 31–32 (2015) (arguing that such paid-peering arrangements are not inherently anti-competitive).
229. See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, Verizon’s Mobile Video Won’t Count Against Data Caps—But Netflix Does, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 5, 2016, 3:44 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology
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the cargo of affiliated lumber and oil companies at rates significantly
below those available to non-affiliated companies.230
These sorts of conflicts will not disappear even if the incumbents’ last-mile market power is ameliorated; they are inherent as long
as conduit owners have a stake in content. Highly concentrated markets just make the problem worse.
3. States’ Historic Role in Overseeing Local and Last-Mile
Competition
The local access network has been the focus of telecommunications regulation for much of its modern history, certainly since the
enactment of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The fundamental
problem was, and is, how to crack the natural monopoly enjoyed by
the owner of last-mile facilities and bring more competition to telecommunications consumers.
The basic bargain embodied by the 1996 Act was the substitution of market discipline for regulatory discipline.231 Under the Act
and its vision of “cooperative federalism,” states were deputized as
competition umpires, with delegated power to enforce the incumbents’
obligation to lease parts of their network to competitors at cost-based
rates,232 whether or not those elements carried interstate or intrastate
/2016/02/verizons-mobile-video-wont-count-against-data-caps-but-netflix-will/ [https://perma.cc/
6C43-F8GH].
230. Cf. RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 113–14 (1998)
(“[R]ailroads acquired a vested interest in the creation of a gigantic oil monopoly . . . an ominous
fact for small, struggling refiners who were gradually weeded out in the savage competitive
strife.”).
231. See Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973,
1048 & n.453, 1049 n.456 (2019) (“[T]he Telecommunications Act of 1996 . . . undid some of the
restrictions on dominant networks in favor of competition.” (citing the Communications Act of
1934, Pub. L. No 73-416 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
56)).
232. Id.; 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–252 (2018); see also infra note 243 and accompanying text (explaining “cooperative federalism”); Gene Kimmelman et al., The Failure of Competition Under the
1996 Telecommunications Act, 58 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 511, 511 (2006) (“The Telecommunications Act of 1996 . . . replaced the regulatory framework of a monopoly era with a radical deregulatory approach that promised new consumer benefits through competitive market forces. This new
competition has never arrived . . . .”).
In its Local Competition Order, implementing §§ 251–252, the FCC propounded national
rules to promote local competition, finding that the Act “expands the applicability of both national
rules to historically intrastate issues, and state rules to historically interstate issues.” Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No.
96–98, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499, 15513 para. 24 (1996) [hereinafter Local Competition Order]. In elaborating on the interconnection and unbundling provisions of the 1996 Act,
“states should have the major responsibility for prescribing the specific terms and conditions that
will lead to competition in local exchange markets.” Id. at 15520 para. 41.
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traffic,233 as well as to arbitrate interconnection disputes between carriers.234
That did not work out so well. The FCC’s efforts to empower
states to open the local access networks failed, and those last-mile networks remained the source of duopoly—if not monopoly —power for
the largest ISPs, due largely to the gutting of the federal regulations
that states were supposed to enforce.235
From a rhetorical point of view, framing broadband as an interstate service served to divert attention from the ongoing lack of
competition in the local access network. A through line of FCC and
court decisions nevertheless recognize that the last mile is a bottleneck
preventing competition and that the primary responsibility for lastmile oversight lies at the state level.
In 1976, the D.C. Circuit described an early form of broadband
access service as a two-way non-video service, offered over “facilities
which, on an intrastate level, now operate under the regulation of state

233. The FCC noted that “it would make little sense in terms of economics or technology to
distinguish between interstate and intrastate components for purposes of sections 251 and 252”
(governing interconnection and unbundling). Local Competition Order, supra note 232, at 15544
para. 84.
234. Section 251 provides that every telecommunications carrier “has the duty to interconnect
directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers.” 47
U.S.C. § 251(a)(1).
235. A central component of the competition plan was the incumbents’ provision of unbundled
network elements (UNEs) at cost-based rates, which the state commissions were to enforce. Although initially agreed on as part of a grand bargain, the incumbents immediately challenged the
network sharing provisions. The courts first overturned the FCC’s proposed nationwide UNE rates,
and then invalidated the so-called UNE-P (as in “platform”), which provided for resale of a complete bundle of services. The CPUC’s Competition Study deftly summed up the situation:
It would be an understatement to say that the concept of unbundling was controversial . . . it led to years of litigation, leading to the rollback of some of the key pricing
concepts for network access. See [Commission Decision] D.06-08-030, pp. 79-84, citing
United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (USTA II);
NEUCHTERLEIN AND WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW &
POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE, The MIT Press, 2d Ed (2013) at 52 (“The 1996 Act immediately spawned protracted litigation about the precise scope of [the CLECs’ network]
leasing rights – litigation pitting the Bell companies and other incumbent local exchange
carriers . . . against their new local exchange rivals”).
Competition Study, supra note 214, at 36 n.83 (citing Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion to Assess and Revise the Regulation of Telecommunications Utilities, Rulemaking 05-04-005, Opinion, Decision No. 06-08-030, slip op. at 79–84 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Aug. 30,
2006),
https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/WORD_PDF/FINAL_DECISION/
59388.PDF [https://perma.cc/Y879-SKWE]); see also Megan Delany, Comment, The Dominos of
Goldwasser: Only Congress Can Stop the Toppling Effect Before the Game Is Over, 10 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS: J. COMMC’NS L. & POL’Y 279, 280 (2002) (incumbents “have consistently engaged
in anticompetitive practices”).
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and local commissions.”236 In that case, the D.C. Circuit rejected the
attempt of the FCC—similar to the instant situation—to preempt states
while offering no affirmative regulations of its own.237 The court saw
regulation of the local access monopoly/duopoly as the states’ domain:
The Commission’s pre-emption of regulation over cable operators in a field where state rate and service regulation over
non-cable operators is pervasive renders the order objectionable as unfair to the regulated entities and as creating the possibility for abuse by the unregulated cable system. This possibility assumes more significance when we observe that the
Commission not only intends to pre-empt state regulation of
the two-way activities, but intends to issue no regulations of
its own to govern these activities, thus leaving them completely unregulated.
. . . State regulatory agencies, engaged for years in regulating the existing competition to the proposed cable channels, are doubtless better fitted to fix those rates—and in our
opinion they have the right reserved by statute to do so.238
John Blevins, in his article on “light touch regulation,” describes how the notion of broadband as an information service has
been used to ensure that broadband “could not be regulated as a common carrier,”239 taking it out of the “pervasive” system of local access
regulation:
The exact language [e.g., “telecommunications service,”
“information service”] of the 1996 Act traces back to the
breakup of AT&T in the early 1980s in response to the Department of Justice’s antitrust litigation. Although the proceeding was complex, the heart of the problem was AT&T’s
control of local facilities. This leg of the network was largely
a monopoly, and its specific economic characteristics made
it uncontestable. AT&T had constructed the local network
over decades with federal subsidies and protections from
competition. It was therefore economically impossible for a
competitor to enter the local access market. It would require

236. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601, 616 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
237. Id. at 617.
238. Id. at 616–17 (citations omitted).
239. Blevins, supra note 206, at 191.
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enormous capital expenditures to build a competing local
network (cable networks were constructed for a different purpose and were only later retrofitted, like the telephone network, to provide broadband).
The larger point is that the AT&T proceeding illustrates
how extensively policymakers regulated local access networks. The government dismantled the world’s largest and
most powerful company precisely because it had abused its
control of local facilities.240
Fast forward forty years, and control of local facilities is still
the issue:
Netflix is the edge destination—that’s what the user actually
wants to see. The user, however, is accessing Netflix’s computers through Comcast’s local infrastructure that connects
her home and neighborhood to the larger network. Comcast
thus provides the road, and Netflix the destination. Comcast’s access service, however, does not facilitate the entire
transmission. It provides the connection at the edges which
provides the capability to send and receive anything. Access
service is thus more analogous to off-ramps and driveways
than to interstate highways. In this sense, Comcast actually
provides the last mile of road, while the entire Internet is the
set of all potential destinations.
Network neutrality rules are therefore only about this last
part of the road—that’s what broadband access means. Access service is distinct from the Internet itself and is provided
almost exclusively by cable and telephone companies (wireless and wireline). The rules aim to prevent access providers
from leveraging physical control over this specific leg of the
network to harm users and edge providers.241
Blevins describes the status quo ante, when local access networks were assumed to be common carrier telecommunications facilities. It was not until the 2002 Cable Modem decision that the FCC
240. Id. at 202–03 (emphasis added); see also id. at 202 n.171 (“Assistant Attorney General
William Baxter found ‘the source of AT&T’s monopoly power to be in its control over the local
networks, which had been protected from competition as a result of state regulation for over seventy
years.’” (quoting Delany, supra note 235, at 292)).
241. Id. at 187–88 (first emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The author takes minor issue with
Prof. Blevins’ use of the adjective “only,” and suggests that “primarily” might be better in this
context. See supra note 26 (regarding upstream neutrality issues).
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decided it could no longer differentiate between the telecommunications and information services offered over the last-mile segment of
the network, effectively pulling the rug out from under the states’ role
(per the “telecommunications” statutes in the Act) as local competition
referees.242 Courts nevertheless continue to pay lip service to states’
role in promoting competition in a system of “cooperative federalism,”
as the 1996 Telecommunications Act foresaw.243
4. States’ Historic Role in Overseeing the Operation of Local and
Last-Mile Infrastructure
Apart from states’ role as competition umpires, state law enables the delivery of BIAS in other ways. As discussed above, state
property and government laws provide essential access; the regulation
of utility infrastructure is also key.
a. Exercise of state police power to regulate “last mile”
infrastructure—poles, conduit, & cell towers
Broadband is in many ways the poor stepchild of state utility
regulation. Although broadband replaced narrowband, and VoIP replaced traditional telephony, communications (including broadband)
continue to be transported over the same wires, cell sites, and infrastructure as before.244 While the infrastructure remained the same,
242. Blevins, supra note 206, at 182–83, 191.
243. See, e.g., Core Commc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon Pa., Inc. (Core v. Verizon), 493 F.3d 333, 337
(3d Cir. 2007). As the court in Core v. Verizon explained:
[T]he Act provides that various responsibilities are to be divided between the state and
federal governments, making it “an exercise in what has been termed cooperative federalism.” That is, “Congress enlisted the aid of state public utility commissions to ensure
that local competition was implemented fairly and with due regard to the local conditions
and the particular historical circumstances of local regulation under the prior regime.”
Id. at 335 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
244. Richard Whitt wrote about incremental improvements to the operation of existing infrastructure: “From the Internet’s perspective, ‘broadband’ and ‘narrowband’ (however defined) essentially are one and the same. As Vint Cerf puts it, ‘DSL technology is merely the latest in a
continuing stream of incremental improvements to the use of the existing telephone network.’”
Whitt, supra note 200, at 658 (quoting Letter from Vinton G. Cerf, Senior Vice President, WorldCom, Inc., to the Hon. Donald Evans, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, and the Hon. Michael Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (May 20, 2002), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/6513391377
.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2YZ-W4KR]); see Narechania & Stallman, supra note 9, at 551 (“Though
the communications service has been updated, the communications infrastructure remains much
the same.”); supra note 25, and note 190 and accompanying text (evolution of shared infrastructure); see also Michael Affrunti, Note, Discontinuance in the Face of Destruction: The Future of
Telecommunications Law After Superstorm Sandy, 41 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 238, 258
(2015) (referring to the evolution of “integrated networks in which ALL forms and modes of traffic—from very narrowband text to narrowband voice to broadband video, image and ‘Big Data’
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industry, the FCC, and some state legislatures seemed intent on deregulating broadband service, based on questionable evidence and arbitrary distinctions.245 Yet state law continues to provide the framework
for the de facto delivery of BIAS to consumers and businesses.
The 1996 Telecommunications Act recognized that (at least
some) states had long been overseeing last-mile utility infrastructure
and gave them the option of continuing to do so. States could maintain
“jurisdiction with respect to rates, terms, and conditions, or access to
poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way” if they had the authority to
do so under state law.246
California has had pole and conduit authority in place since (at
least) 1951,247 and informed the FCC of its intent to maintain state
oversight.248 A large part of California’s infrastructure regulation is
accomplished through CPUC General Orders that apply across sectors
to any utility (or cable company) using the infrastructure. Pursuant to
its police powers, the state has articulated intersectoral safety requirements: General Order (GO) 52 (Construction and operation of power
and communication lines for the prevention or mitigation of inductive
interference); GO 95 (Overhead electric [and communications] line
construction); GO 128 (Construction of underground electric supply

files—are carried over the same broadband infrastructure” (emphasis added) (quoting Alan Pearce
et al., Telecom Act Rewrite Is Needed to Return Real Competition to Broadband Sector,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglaw
news/bloomberg-law-news/X67AG650000000)).
245. Whitt describes the lack of empirical support for these decisions:
[T]he FCC, among other things, created a regulatory distinction between a narrowband,
circuit-switched environment . . . and broadband “packet-switching capability,” for purposes of defining what UNEs should be provided to CLECs. The FCC further devised a
regulatory distinction between mass market fiber-based local loops and copper-based
local loops. In both cases, the Commission appears to believe (without any supporting
empirical evidence) that the particular access medium employed at the various layers is
a more salient factor in determining which UNEs to unbundle, than the market power
and other characteristics of the network provider that employs it.
Whitt, supra note 200, at 649–50 (footnotes omitted); see supra Section III.C.1 (discussing “regulatory arbitrage”).
246. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1) (2018); see also Mozilla v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1,
66 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (twenty states—including California—have opted into this system).
247. Both before and after the 1996 Act, pole & conduit structures were regulated by CAL. PUB.
UTILS. CODE § 767 (enacted 1951), § 767.5 (enacted 1980, adding cable television), and § 767.7
(enacted 1994).
248. Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion into Competition for Local Exchange Service, Rulemaking 95-04-043, Opinion, Decision No. 98-10-058, 1998 Cal. PUC
LEXIS 879 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Oct. 22, 1998).
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and communication systems); and GO 159-A (Construction of cellular
radiotelephone facilities), inter alia.249
GO 159-A, for instance, requires cellular providers to observe
environmental laws, obtain local permits, and report their cell siting
activity. In an example of “subsidiarity” (see policy discussion below),
local governments are empowered to make local cell tower siting decisions, with the CPUC engaged only when there is a clear conflict
between the local decision and state rules or policies.250
In adjudicating disputes between carriers and other utilities
about safe, competitively neutral access to that infrastructure, the
CPUC has identified and tried to solve the information asymmetry between infrastructure owners and would-be attachers as a problem inhibiting deployment.251
The 1996 Act also gave state agencies authority to arbitrate and
resolve interconnection disputes between communications carriers under state law (which the CPUC had been doing for decades),252 even
when the traffic at issue is allegedly interstate.253 The Act recognized
that state commissions had been acting as “referees on the field,” to
adjudicate the conflicting safety and competition interests that collide
around poles, conduit, related infrastructure, rights-of-way, and interconnection agreements.254 The FCC in most cases lacks the resources
to engage in such retail dispute resolution.255
249. CPUC General Orders, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Home/Pro
ceedings-and-Rulemaking/CPUC-general-orders [https://perma.cc/VU9R-HZXB].
250. General Order 159-A at 3 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n May 8, 1996); see, e.g., Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion to Develop Revisions to General Orders and
Rules Applicable to Siting and Environmental Review of Cellular Mobile Radiotelephone Utility
Facilities, Investigation 90-01-012, Opinion Adopting General Order 159-A Rules Relating to the
Construction of Cellular Radiotelephone Facilities in California, Decision No. 96-05-035, 1996
Cal. PUC LEXIS 288 at *9, 37–41 (May 8, 1996) (citing CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 451, 701, 702,
761, 762, 762.5, 1001 (2021)).
251. See Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Contested Places, Utility Pole Spaces: A Competition and
Safety Framework for Analyzing Utility Pole Association Rules, Roles, and Risks, 69 CATH. U. L.
REV. 473, 487–88 (2020). See generally Poles and Conduit Proceeding, supra note 109, at 24 (creation of a shared database for poles and conduit).
252. Interconnection obligations that provide for enforcement under state law are codified in
CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE §§ 558 (enacted 1951), 702, 703, 1702, 1704.
253. 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(4) (2018) (“Action by State Commission”); see, e.g., Glob. NAPs Cal.,
Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 624 F.3d 1225, 1228–29, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding CPUC’s
resolution of an interconnection dispute relating to access charges for IP-originated traffic, against
the claim that VoIP services were definitionally interstate).
254. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(4).
255. Occasionally the carriers will file their disputes with the FCC, but most interconnection
disputes are resolved at the state level, and state law questions often predominate. As Judge Posner
wrote, such disputes are often “not based on federal law in any realistic sense, but on a price term
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While the carriers/ISPs occasionally criticize the adequacy of
the CPUC’s decision-making in regard to infrastructure—infrastructure that supports a network reaching into other states and around the
world—they have by and large not challenged the California’s underlying authority regarding infrastructure.256
b. Exercise of state police power to bridge the digital divide—
oversight and promotion of new broadband infrastructure
A synthesis of the infrastructure/service dichotomy may be
glimpsed in attempts to resolve the unequal access to broadband connectivity, known as the digital divide. States may direct universal service payments that effectively support broadband access to either individuals or carriers, while also attempting to ensure universal
broadband service by promoting deployment of more broadband infrastructure. Although perhaps unsuccessful measured in terms of affordability (see discussion of competition above), states encourage
(and often subsidize) the deployment of infrastructure to provide
broadband service to otherwise unserved communities.257
In 2006, the California Legislature passed the Digital Infrastructure and Video Competition Act (DIVCA), which purported to
promote “video competition” by preempting municipal cable
in a contract,” and the dispute can be resolved “under the law of contracts . . . for which a state
forum can supply a remedy.” Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Ill., Inc., 551 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir.
2008); see, e.g., Glob. NAPs Cal., 624 F.3d at 1229.
256. The carriers have, for example, sought CPUC resolution of utility pole access issues for
broadband transport facilities, inter alia, notwithstanding objections made elsewhere to Commission jurisdiction over broadband service. See Decision Amending the Right-of-Way Rules, supra
note 196, at 18 (reflecting the participation of Cox, AT&T, and other plaintiffs in a proceeding that
effectively gave wireless broadband providers access to poles and conduit).
257. Both federal and state governments have attempted to directly subsidize broadband service
by universal service funding, and both have had programs to subsidize broadband deployment.
Whether or not the Communications Act actually delegates a deployment mandate to states (a disputed matter), California has proceeded under its state police power.
Federal recognition or authorization of state authority to promote broadband deployment
seems clear: “The Commission and each State commission with regulatory jurisdiction over telecommunications services shall encourage [broadband] deployment . . . by utilizing . . . measures
that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that
remove barriers to infrastructure investment.” Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 706, 47 U.S.C.
§ 1302 (emphasis added); see also Verizon v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 740 F.3d 623, 638 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (“Congress has granted regulatory authority to state telecommunications commissions
on other occasions, and we see no reason to think that it could not have done the same here.”). But
see Charles M. Davidson & Michael J. Santorelli, Broadband, the States, and Section 706: Regulatory Federalism in the Open Internet Era, 8 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 211, 216 (2016) (arguing that “state PUCs refrain from looking to section 706 as a source of regulatory authority” and
instead promote competition in a deregulatory framework).
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franchising, while also codifying minimal state oversight of digital infrastructure, in order to “[c]omplement efforts to increase investment
in broadband infrastructure and close the digital divide.”258 In practice,
DIVCA’s data collection provisions are perhaps its most (if not only)
useful sections devoted to broadband, as reflected in the Competition
Study cited above.259
Among other things, the data show that there are parts of California still without broadband service, especially in rural areas.260
This is no different than what happened with plain old telephone service (POTS),261 and, if one goes back further, with rural electrification—in both cases, government had to step in to mitigate market failure.262 California has implemented an Advanced Services Fund
(CASF) to provide grants for broadband deployment in unserved areas, funded by surcharges imposed on intrastate revenues from voice
(including wireless and VoIP, but excluding broadband services), and
administered by the CPUC.263 The program has been criticized as inadequate to the problem it addresses, but nevertheless represents an
affirmative use of state power to remedy market failure.264
258. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 5810(a)(2)(E) (emphasis added). The “Digital Infrastructure”
in the Act’s title is the tail wagging the dog; apart from sections 5810 and 5960, it contains nothing
substantively addressing digital infrastructure (broadband). See supra note 212 and accompanying
text.
259. Pursuant to CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 5810(a)(2)(E), broadband providers are required to
annually provide the Commission its deployment and subscription data, often some version of their
Form 477 data. See Competition Study, supra note 214, at 72, 187.
260. Competition Study, supra note 214, at 144.
261. In the POTS world, California High Cost Funds A and B were implemented to facilitate
telephone service in rural and other “high cost” areas of the state. See program pages at California
High Cost Fund-A, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/int
ernet-and-phone/california-high-cost-fund-a [https://perma.cc/TKS7-H3TX], California High
Cost Fund-B, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/internetand-phone/california-high-cost-fund-b [https://perma.cc/Q9UR-NN4B].
262. SUSAN CRAWFORD, FIBER: THE COMING TECH REVOLUTION—AND WHY AMERICA
MIGHT MISS IT 44, 203 (2018).
263. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 281 (codifying CASF); California Advanced Services Fund
(CASF), CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/casf/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) (program documentation).
264. CASF-subsidized deployment has been de facto almost solely in “unserved” areas; subsidizing deployment in “underserved” communities is no longer part of the program, to avoid funding
competition for the incumbents. Thus, the program does little for affordability. See generally Competition Study, supra note 214, at 145–46. As this article heads toward publication, the California
Legislature has stepped into the fray, proposing amendments to section 281 that would redefine
“unserved” at the 25/3 Mbps standard, thus requiring the incumbent to show something more than
bare minimum existing service in order to prevent new competitive deployment. See S.B. 4, 2021–
2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021). More significantly, it has appropriated approximately six billion
dollars to build open access middle mile fiber, fund rural deployment, and encourage municipal
broadband. Assemb. B. 156, 2021–2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021).

(8) 55.1_WITTEMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

132

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/16/22 4:43 PM

[Vol. 55:65

D. Policy Issues: Balancing State and Federal Interests Going
Forward
After determining that the “impossibility exception” (and with
it broadband’s “jurisdictionally interstate” classification) describe not
facts but policy and operational preferences, we are left with the question of what a rational and adequate framework for national, state, and
local BIAS regulation would look like. How can state and local interests rooted in public safety, utility and property law, and the increased
awareness that broadband is an essential service, be given their due,
while maintaining a necessary minimum of national consistency? The
question applies not only to net neutrality but to all regulatory issues
where broadband connectivity is involved.
The arguments against allowing the states a meaningful role in
BIAS regulation are suggested above, and boil down to consistency
and alleged corporate efficiency. They are typified by the remarks of
AT&T’s CEO after passage of the California law, who proclaimed that
it “would be a total disaster for the technology and innovation that you
see happening in the Silicon Valley and elsewhere . . . to pick our head
up and have 50 different sets of rules for companies trying to operate
in the United States.”265 Such objections suggest several responses.
First, while a national framework would be desirable, the relative convenience of industry or its regulators is not sufficient reason
to truncate state sovereignty,266 and would not outweigh the benefits
of shared jurisdiction described below.
Second, the notion that shared competency for the fair operation of the physical network would somehow choke off innovation at
the edge of the network seems illogical. As technologists and industry
leaders have observed, it is a neutral network that makes possible the
next dorm room wonder.267 Joining or supporting the appeal from the
265. Is Data Privacy Regulation Inevitable?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://on.wsj.com/
2QJD9vc [https://perma.cc/QZ8Q-P2SX]; see also Lawrence J. Spiwak, The Biden Administration
Subjects the Internet to a “Death by 50 State Cuts,” THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y BLOG (Feb. 10, 2021),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/the-biden-administration-subjects-the-internet-to-adeath-by-50-state-cuts [https://perma.cc/JZ3E-NJEF] (discussing the subjection of IP-enabled services to different state regulations, as opposed to one coherent plan towards net neutrality).
266. See Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601, 614
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381, 383, 195 Cal. 477, 484 (1925) (“The
police power of a state is an indispensable prerogative of sovereignty and one that is not to be
lightly limited.”); see also McKay Jewelers v. Bowron, 122 P.2d 543, 546, 19 Cal. 2d 595, 600
(Cal. 1942) (addressing an issue raised regarding whether an ordinance violated both state and
federal constitutions).
267. See, e.g., Joint Technologists’ Comments, supra note 24, at 13.
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FCC’s RIFO decision were, besides Mozilla: Vimeo; Etsy; Ebay;
Computer & Communications Industry Association; Twilio; Bitly;
Cogent Communications; Kickstarter; GitHub; Patreon; Pinterest;
Postmates; Reddit; and engineers and technologists working at
Google, Twitter, and various research facilities.268 Many of these same
groups, as well as competitive carriers and others in the technology
sector, supported California’s SB 822.269
Lastly, it is possible for large national carriers to comply with
local laws, although they often assert that unitary and exclusive national standards are imperative because they operate their networks on
a national basis. On closer inspection, the reality of (and carriers’ preference for) a regional and often hyper-local approach to operations,
policies, and marketing often becomes apparent, as the CPUC has
found in its consumer protection cases.270 Former FCC Chief Technologist Scott Jordan describes how BIAS business rules can be set at
the individual and local access network level, and thus calibrated to
state and local laws.271

268. Id. at 43–53 (signed by approximately 200 individual technologists working at these companies); Mozilla v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Lemley & Lessig, supra
note 175, at 932 (“Because it does not discriminate in favor of certain uses of the network and
against others, the Internet has . . . encouraged an extraordinary amount of innovation in many different contexts.”).
269. See CA Net Neutrality Law–Full List of Supporters, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/document/ca-net-neutrality-law-full-list-supports [https://perma.cc/MZM3UH8P].
270. In one of the first serious investigations of marketing fraud in the wireless industry, the
Commission cited to record evidence in rejecting the claim that Cingular’s early termination fee
was a nationwide policy and therefore an improper subject for the California Commission to investigate: “the contract policy effective in California . . . while standard within the Western Region,
was by no means a national standard. In fact, . . . Cingular’s other regions had more customerfriendly policies.” See, e.g., Investigation on the Commission’s Own Motion into the Operations,
Practices, and Conduct of Pacific Bell Wireless LLC dba Cingular Wireless, U-3060, U-4135 and
U-4314, and Related Entities (Collectively “Cingular”) to Determine Whether Cingular Has Violated the Laws, Rules and Regulations of This State in Its Sale of Cellular Telephone Equipment
and Service and Its Collection of an Early Termination Fee and Other Penalties from Consumers,
Investigation 02-06-003, Opinion Ordering Penalties and Reparations, Decision No. 04-09-062,
slip op. at 38 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 29, 2004) https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/
WORD_PDF/FINAL_DECISION/40226.PDF [https://perma.cc/7LG5-BXYV], aff’d sub nom.
Pac. Bell Wireless, LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n., 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 733, 140 Cal. App. 4th 718 (Ct.
App. 2006).
271. California Declarant Jordan describes how blocking and throttling and application-specific
discrimination can be activated (or not) at the state, local, and individual level. Jordan Declaration,
supra note 27, at 6–8 paras. 15–22; id. at 6 para. 16 (“Comcast implemented this blocking practice
by interrupting the Internet traffic within each customer’s access network to and from this application.”); id. at 6 para. 17 (carrier can implement blocking or “refrain from applying that practice to
packets to or from customers in California”); id. at 7–8 para. 21 (in wireless networks, “throttling
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Shared federal and state jurisdiction over broadband Internet
access offers a number of potential benefits:
• Above all else, promoting an all-hands-on-deck approach
to regulating broadband connectivity.272 Neither state nor
federal regulators have covered themselves with glory in
this area. Both are said to be “captured” by the industries
they supposedly regulate,273 and both are constrained by
lack of resources;274
• Allowing the states to access FCC and other information
resources, helping to ameliorate what has been called the
“information asymmetry” between industry and the regulating agencies;275
is implemented locally, in the access network that connects a set of cellular base stations to the
wired network”).
272. Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1329 (2004):
American government faces, and will continue to face, enormous social problems with
which it must deal. In this regard, federalism can make a crucial difference. The value
of having multiple levels of government lies in having many institutions capable of acting to solve social problems. From this perspective, federalism should be viewed as not
being about limits on any level of government, but empowering each to act to solve
difficult social issues.
273. David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure Risks, in PREEMPTION CHOICE:
THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 54, 56–57 (William W.
Buzbee ed., 2009) [hereinafter PREEMPTION CHOICE]:
Students of regulation have identified . . . overarching structural limitations in the regulatory system that often lead to systemic regulatory failure. One problem is that agencies
are often “captured” by the businesses they regulate. . . . Agency officials work closely
with their counterparts in industry . . . [and] there is a natural interaction among them.
Industry representatives also rotate in and out of the government through a “revolving
door” that leads directly to the boardrooms and law offices of regulated industry.
274. Id. at 58 (citing staffing numbers at various federal agencies). Resource constraints exist.
Adequate staffing for state agencies entrusted with public safety and welfare is also a difficult issue,
beyond the scope of this article, complicated by many constraints, including political opposition,
civil service rules, low pay, and inadequate communication within and among state agencies and
between state and federal agencies.
275. Id. at 57. The asymmetry in information resources gives regulated industry an ability to
manipulate the outcome of agency proceedings by withholding information, cherry-picking the information they provide to the agency, or manufacturing uncertainty by giving the agency incomplete, outdated, or inaccurate information.
The CPUC’s Competition Study echoed these concerns:
In pursuing this Investigation, it has become clear to us that the problem of regulation
can be expressed as a problem of information, or lack thereof. Full information about,
and visibility into, the telecommunications network and its associated markets would
allow the regulator’s choices to be data driven, and regulation to be as efficient as we
would like the market to be. There is, however, a fundamental asymmetry at work here,
as carriers possess detailed information about the operations of the network and market,
while regulators try to piece together a picture of the network and market from incomplete information.
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Conversely, facilitating the FCC’s access to state information, generated in the course of state utility commission
oversight of “multi-sector critical infrastructures—including gas, electricity, communications and often water facilities . . . key to post-disaster restoration efforts,” as well
pre-disaster planning;276
Halting the jurisdictional finger-pointing and regulatory
arbitrage that occurs in non-overlapping jurisdictional
schemes;277
Distributing authority between federal and state government, helping to correct the excesses of the “unitary executive,” including the wild swings in policy seen in recent
years,278 thus providing an anchor to ensure resiliency and
“durability” of policies that otherwise are subject to an abrupt about-face every four years;279
Moving some regulation closer to the ground, making it
more fact-specific, allowing solutions better tailored to local concerns, and fostering greater citizen engagement;280
and as often remarked

Competition Study, supra note 214, at 119.
276. Notice of Ex Parte Communication from James Bradford Ramsay, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l
Ass’n of Regul. Util. Comm’rs, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Nov. 1,
2018) [hereinafter NARUC ex parte], https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1102211816189/18%201101%20
NARUC%20Ex%20Parte%20re%20NORS.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UGG-A4RH] (urging more cooperation between federal and state agencies, particularly in regard to disaster reporting); see also
supra Sections III.A.1, III.A.3, III.C.4.a; Koponen v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 22,
165 Cal. App. 4th 345 (Ct. App. 2008) (highlighting the fact that investor-owned energy utilities
are now offering commercial fiber communications transport, which points in turn to the need for
inter-sectoral regulation). State utility agencies are uniquely positioned to so engage here. See, e.g.,
Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Broadband Infrastructure Deployment and to Support
Service Providers in the State of California, supra note 13, at 9–10, 19 (asking “[w]hat business
models could the California energy Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) employ to make their existing
and future fiber infrastructure more available” for telecommunications uses); supra notes 130–133
and accompanying text (instances of cross-utility interdependence).
277. See supra Section III.C.1.
278. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 1, at 272 (“shifting our focus from a unitary administrative
state to multiple administrative states”); see also Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson,
Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 273, at 13, 16 (citing
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
279. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 1, at 325 (“furnishing a degree of stability in the face of federal
regulatory whiplash”).
280. Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 278, at 16–17.
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•

Allowing states to function as “laboratories” of innovation.281
The concern about “information asymmetry” bears emphasis,
as it is woven into every issue addressed in this paper. As the CPUC
put it, “the problem of regulation can be expressed as a problem of
information.”282 If federalism is to be truly cooperative, a first step in
that process would be for federal and state agencies to fully and actively share information rather than accede to industry’s confidentiality claims and protective orders that effectively silo information and
hamstring public decision making.283
Various templates are available to apportion authority and accountability between and among federal, state, and local layers of government—dual jurisdiction,284 “cooperative federalism” as envisioned
281. Id. at 17 (citing Justice Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory.”)).
282. Competition Study, supra note 214, at 119; supra note 275 and accompanying text.
283. NARUC ex parte, supra note 276 (expressing frustration with the industry’s unfounded
confidentiality objections and the FCC’s attempt to “micromanage” the states). NARUC and the
CPUC had been asking the FCC for over a decade to release the FCC’s Network Outage Report
System (NORS) to the states. See NAT’L ASS’N REGUL. UTIL. COMM’RS, RESOL. ON STATE
ACCESS TO THE NETWORK OUTAGE REPORTING SYS. & DISASTER INFO. REPORTING SYS. FILINGS
6 (Nov. 10, 2020) [hereinafter NARUC RESOLUTION], https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/482A73BA155D-0A36-3113-6E08FE414088 [https://perma.cc/M2VT-67D8] (“Whereas the [CPUC] petitioned the [FCC] requesting direct access to the FCC’s [NORS] on November 12, 2009.”). The
carriers objected to sharing these reports, even with other public agencies, although the outages
were painfully apparent to those affected. The carriers claimed the reports contained sensitive information, the release of which to states (even on a confidential basis) could threaten national security (time, date, location, number of customers affected, whether E911 involved, among the allegedly sensitive data).
Frustrated by the lack of movement on this issue, and having constructed its own statewide
outage reporting system in the interim, the CPUC withdrew its Petition in 2018 while other states
pressed forward. See id. Industry’s use of confidentiality claims to frustrate effective government
oversight is also reflected in New Cingular Wireless. See supra notes 87 and 217 and accompanying
text; see also Rob Frieden, Improving the FCC’s Data Collection and Disclosure Practices,
TELEFRIEDEN BLOG (Aug. 20, 2010, 2:48 PM), http://telefrieden.blogspot.com/2010/08/improvi
ng-fccs-data-collection-and.html [https://perma.cc/58JG-DJS8] (calling for open access to FCC
collected data and a rebuttable presumption that the public is entitled to data that would inform
consumer choices).
On March 18, 2021, the FCC released a Second Report and Order allowing limited access
to disaster outage information by state agencies, under strict confidentiality provisions and “need
to know” restrictions. Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission’s Rules Concerning Disruptions
to Communications, PS Docket No. 15-80, Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35
FCC Rcd. 2239, 2244 para. 15 (2020).
284. Robert Schapiro suggests that the original “true dual federalism” involved separate “enclaves of exclusive state jurisdiction and exclusive federal jurisdiction.” Robert A. Schapiro, From
Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 273, at 33, 47. The court in AT&T v.
Core refers to “dual federal/state jurisdiction” in the sense of parallel and at least partially overlapping jurisdictional realms. 806 F.3d 715, 727 (3d Cir. 2015).
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in the 1996 Telecommunications Act,285 the more nuanced principle
of “subsidiarity” as practiced in the European Union,286 and other hybrid approaches.287
Dual jurisdiction and cooperative federalism are discussed
above. Although a full treatment of subsidiarity is beyond the scope of
this Article,288 it offers a fresh perspective, a procedural requirement
that legislative and administrative tribunals engage in “inquiry before
concluding that action at the Community rather than Member State
level is warranted.”289
[U]nder the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not
fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level . . . .290
A feature of subsidiarity is an announced preference for lower
level decision-making, actively seeking the lowest level of government capable of exercising authority in a given context.291 “[S]ubsidiarity means that regulation should be carried out by the states, unless

285. Core Commc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon Pa., Inc. (Core v. Verizon), 493 F.3d. 333, 335 (3d Cir.
2007).
286. E.g., Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation: Dividing the Local from the State in Congressional Decision Making, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 359 (2012) (“An influential concept in
Europe but also prevalent in the United States . . . .”); George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity
Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331,
338–39 (1994).
287. Schapiro suggests regulatory “polyphony”: rather than two contiguous realms, he prefers
the “aural metaphor of polyphony,” which “presents an alternative in which state power and federal
power exist in the same space but remain distinct voices of authority.” Schapiro, supra note 284,
at 42 (emphasis added). While this sounds fanciful, it is really a plea for application of “a background presumption that state power and federal power can coexist.” Id. at 51.
288. There is considerable literature on subsidiarity. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 286, at 359;
Bermann, supra note 286; Alex Mills, Federalism in the European Union and the United States:
Subsidiarity, Private Law, and the Conflict of Laws, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 369 passim (2010); Ran
Hirschl & Ayelet Shachar, Spatial Statism, 17 INT’L J. CONST. L. 387, 409 (2019) (“[C]enturies-old
ideas about federalism and subsidiarity.”). This article passes no judgment on subsidiarity’s social
or ecclesiastical roots and content but references it as a procedural approach to resolving questions
of federalism. Cf. Ivar A. Hartmann, A Right to Free Internet? On Internet Access and Social
Rights, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 297, 394 (2013) (“[C]oncept . . . has roots in Ancient Greece, but a
modern construction more similar to the one applicable in social rights theory can be traced back
to 19th century Catholic doctrine.”).
289. Bermann, supra note 286, at 336.
290. Mills, supra note 288, at 376 (quoting Treaty on European Union tit. I art. 5(3), Feb. 7,
1992, 53 O.J. 20).
291. Decker, supra note 286, at 359 (“[S]ubsidiarity theory posits that power and responsibility
should be devoted to the lowest level of government capable of exercising it well.”).
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there is a justification for action to be taken at the federal level.”292 It
“expresses a preference for governance at the most local level consistent with achieving government’s stated purposes.”293 In making
the subsidiarity decision, the responsible tribunal shall take “due account of the States’ willingness and capacity to act on the matter at
hand.”294
Taking into account competence and purpose on the one hand,
and willingness and capacity on the other, is there sufficient justification for exclusive FCC jurisdiction over broadband, and preemption
of active states broadband regulation? The FCC’s statutory competence and purpose are described in section 151 of Title 47: “regulating
interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio,”
making available to all people “without discrimination” a network
with “adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purposes of national defense . . . [and the] safety of life and property.”295 Section 152
divides federal and state competencies, by allotting subject matter jurisdiction to the FCC for “all interstate and foreign communication by
wire or radio,” and reserving to the states all “jurisdiction with respect
to . . . charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service by
wire or radio.”296 The distinction in this division is that the states were
given exclusive jurisdiction (“nothing in this chapter shall . . . give the
Commission jurisdiction with respect to . . . intrastate communication”), while the FCC received jurisdiction over “all interstate . . .
communication” but without an exclusivity provision.297 This alone
suggests that FCC preemption of all state broadband regulation goes
beyond its statutory grant of jurisdiction.
Considerations of capacity and willingness may point to a similar result. To sample a few data points: the FCC has been unable to
maintain regulations regarding battery-backup for cell towers and
landline remote terminals (while California has);298 it has failed, over
292. Mills, supra note 288, at 377; see also Decker, supra note 286, at 359 (“The higher level
of government must justify its retention of authority over a given matter.”).
293. Bermann, supra note 286, at 339.
294. Id. at 372.
295. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2018).
296. Id. § 152(a)–(b).
297. Id.
298. See discussion of California and the FCC’s regulations concerning battery backup at cell
sites, and how the FCC’s regulations were stalled and ultimately defeated on appeal, supra notes
73, 112–113, 117–124 and accompanying text.
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ten years, to arrive at any mechanism to share network outage data
with the states;299 it continues to accept as true the exaggerated carrier
claims of broadband deployment;300 it stood by while California litigated the use of more accurate carrier subscription reports in order to
measure intrastate (and local) competition;301 and watched California
take the lead in investigating wireless marketing fraud and prosecuting
the collection of unauthorized charges (“cramming”).302 This list is incomplete by definition, but suggests the sort of inquiry that might be
made about capacity and willingness.303
State agencies are by no means innocent of regulatory deficiencies, but it also cannot be said that the FCC has shown special
expertise or capability in these matters. The fact that states nevertheless so often end up on the wrong side of preemption battles tempts
one to agree with Professor Chemerinsky, when he says that “federalism is used, as it has been so often throughout American history, to
cloak politicized substantive value choices in a seemingly more

299. See supra notes 276, 283 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 216–217. Steve Lohr, Digital Divide Is Wider than We Think, Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/technology/digital-divide-usfcc-microsoft.html [https://perma.cc/SHX2-8Y65] (“Microsoft concluded that 162.8 million people do not use the internet at broadband speeds, while the F.C.C. says broadband is not available to
[only] 24.7 million Americans. The discrepancy is particularly stark in rural areas.”); cf. Broadband
Mapping: Challenges and Solutions: Hearing Before the U.S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp.,
116th Cong. 2, 5 (2019) (statement of Mike McCormick, President, Miss. Farm Bureau Fed’n),
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/C87F4960-015C-4F3F-8EFF-E1060C49A540
[https://perma.cc/C86T-J6N3].
301. See description of New Cingular Wireless, supra notes 86, 216, 283 and accompanying
text.
302. See supra note 270 (describing investigation of Pacific Bell [Cingular] Wireless);
Telseven, LLC; Calling 10, LLC, Patrick Hines a/k/a P. Brian Hines, Notice of Apparent Liability
for Forfeiture, 27 FCC Rcd. 15558, 15558 para. 1 n.4 (2012), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachm
ents/FCC-12-146A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J77W-WJPD] (citing CPUC’s prosecution of a nationwide cramming scheme costing California ratepayers over $21 million in unauthorized charges).
CPUC’s prosecution resulted in a $19.76 million fine against the corporate respondents and their
principal Hines. Order Instituting Investigation on the Commission’s Own Motion into the Operations, Practices, and Conduct of Telseven, LLC, Calling 10 LLC dba California Calling 10,
(U7015C), and Patrick Hines, an Individual, to Determine Whether Telseven, Calling 10, and Patrick Hines have Violated the Laws, Rules and Regulations of this State in the Provision of Directory
Assistance Services to California Consumers, Investigation 10-12-010, Decision Different to Modified Presiding Officer’s Decision Finding that Corporate Respondents and Patrick Hines Placed
Unauthorized Charges on California Telephone Bills and Closing Proceeding, Decision No. 14-08033, slip op. 43, para. 2 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Aug. 18, 2014), https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/Publis
hedDocs/Published/G000/M102/K347/102347427.PDF [https://perma.cc/FEV4-NF9M].
303. See Frieden, supra note 211, for a more in-depth analysis of key FCC regulatory failures.
“Far too many major decisions of the [FCC] rely on flawed assumptions about the current and
future telecommunications marketplaces.” Id. at 959.
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neutral and palatable garb.”304 One can see the “jurisdictionally interstate” label as an example of the “seemingly more neutral and palatable garb” that Chemerinsky describes.
If, however, the Mozilla decision left the states with tabula
rasa, a prospect that California’s Opposition brief suggests,305 it may
be time for recalibration. Clearing away the fuzzy thinking around the
“jurisdictionally interstate” classification would help, perhaps replacing it with a label like “federally important” to reflect its real function.
In some cases, the matter will be relatively clear—states have an immediate and compelling interest in the reliability and resiliency of networks within their borders; the federal government has an interest in
ensuring universal interconnection.306 Deference to state and local
governments should, consistent with subsidiarity and other principles
of shared jurisdiction, include states’ roles as competition umpires (including network opening, unbundling and interconnection obligations), consumer protection enforcers (including net neutrality rules),
and network monitoring and data gathering nodes.

304. Chemerinsky, supra note 272, at 1328. Chemerinsky delivers an optimistic plea for empowering both federal and state regulators and encouraging them to work together, but seeds it with
a lacerating critique of the federal preemption status quo:
More profoundly, the Court’s recent decisions finding preemption expose the political content of its federalism rulings. The Court has eagerly found preemption of state
laws regulating business, such as tobacco companies, the auto industry, and insurance
companies. On the other hand, most of the Supreme Court’s federalism decisions invalidating federal laws have struck down civil rights laws—such as the Violence Against
Women Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Comparing the Court’s preemption rulings with its decisions limiting Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals that what animates the Rehnquist
Court is not a concern for states’ rights and federalism. Rather, the Court is hiding its
value choices to limit civil rights laws and to protect business from regulation in decisions that seem to be about very specific doctrines of constitutional law, such as the
scope of the commerce power and the circumstances of preemption.
Id. at 1315; see also RIFO, supra note 2, at 540 (Clyburn, Comm’r, dissenting) (“If it benefits
industry, preemption is good; if it benefits consumers, preemption is bad.”).
305. California Opposition, supra note 16, at 20:
[T]he FCC’s lack of authority to impose net neutrality regulations for BIAS does not
prevent the states from doing so. “If Congress wanted Title I to vest the Commission
with some form of Dormant-Commerce-Clause-like power to negate States’ statutory
(and sovereign) authority just by washing its hands of its own regulatory authority, Congress could have said so.” Nothing in the Act indicates that the FCC’s lack of authority
reflects a congressional determination that the states’ traditional police powers should
be subject to the same limitations as the FCC’s powers.
Id. (quoting Mozilla v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 940 F.3d 1, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2019)).
306. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 558 (2021); 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2018).
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Beside interconnection rules writ large (no state a walled garden), the FCC’s subject matter jurisdiction and statutory authority to
protect interstate communications also justifies its taking a primary
role in spectrum allocation, technical standards regarding non-interference and device safety, and a non-exclusive role in a second attempt
to develop national standards for unbundling and network element
costing. Even with regard to net neutrality, the FCC could—again under the rubric of interconnection—define a national “floor” (as it has
done with consumer protection issues like slamming and cramming),
leaving the states free to enforce those standards, fill gaps, and articulate further requirements appropriate to their particular needs.307
The keys to drawing reasonable lines between state and federal
interests will be good data, accurate network mapping, real time outage data, subscriber and market power data, inter alia—all now subject to the information asymmetry described above—in order to ascertain the contours of the problem to be addressed and the most
appropriate level of government response.
The 2015 Open Internet Order did no real weighing of federal
and state interests before preempting a litany of presumed “inconsistent” state activity.308 Empirical evidence that begins with the local
and the physical,309 analyzed in a subsidiarity framework, could have
been relevant then, and would today help balance federal and state interests in broadband access, including digital divide and deployment
issues.310

307. See parallel FCC and CPUC prosecutions of Telseven and Patrick Hines, supra note 302;
see also Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 278, at 19 (“Congress may specify that federal law
serve as a ‘floor’ of minimum protection but that states remain free to adopt standards that are more
protective of health or the environment.”); cf. In re NOS Commc’ns, 495 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding the Federal Communications Act does not preempt claims for deceptive practices under
Washington Consumer Protection Act).
308. The 2015 Open Internet Order, after establishing bright-line rules—no blocking, no throttling, no unreasonable interference—went on to preempt States from doing anything “inconsistent”
with its “carefully tailored” and “comprehensive regulatory scheme.” Open Internet Order, supra
note 12, at 5804 para. 433. Specifically prohibited were the imposition of “any new state [universal
service] contributions on broadband,” any market-entry restrictions “through certification requirements,” any rate regulation “through tariffs or otherwise,” or any of the regulatory mechanisms on
which the FCC’s Order exercised forbearance regarding certain information collection and reporting provisions, discontinuance of service requirements, and “the interconnection and market-opening provisions” of sections 251–252, inter alia. Id. at 5803–04 paras. 432–33.
309. E.g., Joint Technologists’ Comments, supra note 24; Jordan Declaration, supra note 27,
at 2–4 paras. 4–10.
310. See, for example, Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding Broadband Infrastructure Deployment and to Support Service Providers in the State of California, supra note 13, for discussion

(8) 55.1_WITTEMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

142

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

2/16/22 4:43 PM

[Vol. 55:65

A willing federal partner could support cities’ and rural cooperatives’ construction of fiber networks,311 facilitating what is essentially a local process in the same way the federal Rural Electrification
Act empowered rural collectives to supply electricity to those without.312 The industry’s objection that a patchwork of state laws would
hinder its operations does not seem to apply to publicly-sponsored networks in areas where the carriers have no operations, or where their
unreliable, slow, and aging infrastructure is tantamount to an abandonment of service. One thinks of Chattanooga,313 Utah’s Utopia Project,314 and the competitively neutral wholesale-only networks operated successfully in Stockholm and other cities315 as examples of states
and localities taking the initiative.316 Markets have failed to provide
the competition promised in the 1996 Act, and local governments are
looking for alternatives.

on broadband deployment strategies. One thinks of municipal cell siting as another issue ripe for a
subsidiarity analysis, although beyond the scope of this paper.
311. Municipal fiber initiatives have sometimes pitted asserted state sovereignty against locals’
desire for telecommunications independence, or a federal policy preference for such local independence—a tripartite subsidiarity conundrum. The FCC first allowed such state-level prohibitions
(under President Clinton) and then banned them (under President Obama). See Mikhail Guttentag,
A Light in Digital Darkness: Public Broadband after Tennessee v. FCC, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH.
311, 350–73 (2018); cf. Eric Null, Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide, 9 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR
THE INFO. SOC’Y 21 (2013) (describing three successful and two unsuccessful municipal broadband
projects and summarizing business models used in each).
Annie Decker’s article on separating local and state preemption issues suggests subsidiarity as a potential means of resolving the standoff that occurs when state governments oppose local
broadband initiatives. Decker, supra note 286, at 359–62.
312. CRAWFORD, supra note 262, at 44, 203. See generally Rural Electrification Act of 1936,
7 U.S.C. §§ 901–914 (1940), https://perma.cc/MZZ8-8FGQ (authorizing the disbursement of federal funds to local, state, and nonprofit entities to fund electricity-providing infrastructure).
313. Guttentag, supra note 311, at 317–18.
314. The Utopia Fiber Difference, UTOPIA, https://www.utopiafiber.com/the-utopia-fiber-diff
erence/ [https://perma.cc/HTT5-WVUQ] (describing its open access network over which customers can subscribe to the ISP of their choice, i.e., an ISP that is not itself a last-mile carrier).
315. Stokab, the public entity providing wholesale-only fiber to Stockholm, has a helpful website. See STOKAB, https://www.stokab.se/en/stokab.html [https://perma.cc/HW87-FQQ2]; see also
CRAWFORD, supra note 262, at 68–69; ILSA GODLOVITCH & TSEVEEN GANTUMUR, WIKCONSULT, THE ROLE OF WHOLESALE ONLY MODELS IN FUTURE NETWORKS AND APPLICATIONS
(Mar. 2018) https://www.stokab.se/download/18.796da515175469f3e544f/1603888583380/The
%20role%20of%20wholesale%20only%20models%20in%20future%20networks%20and%20app
lications_(2018),%20WIK-Consult.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4RV-CVGJ] (report on wholesale-only
networks and infrastructure investment in Europe).
316. San Francisco could have been on the list, but its proposal for a wholesale-only municipal
fiber network ran into political headwinds and problematic cost-projections. Bill Snyder & Chris
Witteman, The Anti-Competitive Forces that Foil Speedy, Affordable Broadband, FAST COMPANY,
(Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90319916/the-anti-competitive-forces-that-foilspeedy-affordable-broadband [https://perma.cc/8VG7-Y6QE].

(8) 55.1_WITTEMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

NET NEUTRALITY FROM THE GROUND UP

2/16/22 4:43 PM

143

Such localized and real-world concerns are among the reasons
courts rarely grant the type of broad claims asserted in California and
Vermont for exclusive federal authority over anything touching on
“interstate . . . communications.”317 “It matters not whether we or the
FCC believe that one national laboratory would be better than 50 separate schemes of regulation.”318
The case has not yet been made, by the FCC or the carriers,
why a national across-the-board prohibition of state net neutrality and
other broadband interventions would be justified. What is the balance
between a core set of standards needed for nationwide (and worldwide) network coherence on the one hand, and the insult to the states’
retained rights that occurs when states are prohibited from ensuring
their citizens’ welfare? In subsidiarity parlance, which level of government is best positioned to protect public safety, health, welfare, and
“convenience and necessity”319 in the delivery of broadband services?
These are the law and policy questions that must be confronted
when legislators, regulators, judges, and industry put aside the “jurisdictionally interstate” fiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The assumptions of this Article have been: (i) broadband Internet access is an increasingly essential utility service and will remain
so into the future; (ii) broadband Internet access is in the first instance
a local service, delivered over a local access network, the physical reality of which is wires and local radio transmissions; and (iii) adequate
regulation of the powerful oligopolistic private networks delivering
BIAS requires an “all hands on deck” approach, i.e., that states be
more fully enfranchised to oversee and regulate that service. Such
oversight, ideally, would be exercised in concert with the federal government, but states should act on their own if—as has now occurred—
317. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2018). “Evidence of pre-emptive purpose,” especially the broad
preemptive purpose asserted by the United States and the ISPs in the state litigation, must be
“sought in the text and structure of the statute at issue.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S.
658, 664 (1993); see also Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1909, 1915 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (concurring in decision upholding state law claims despite warnings “of dire
consequences if all 50 States enact bans similar to [the challenged statute],” and rejecting the claim
that a state prohibition of uranium mining interfered with the purposes of the Atomic Energy Act).
318. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601, 619 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
319. A certificate of “public convenience and necessity” (CPCN) is, in most instances, a prerequisite for operating a telephone carrier in California. CAL. PUB. UTILS. CODE § 1001 (2021); see
also supra notes 195, 197, and accompanying text (examples of issues involving CPCNs).
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the federal government abdicates any role in such oversight and regulation.
This Article accepts that the federal government has an important role to play in establishing an effective national broadband policy. But to preempt the states as broadly as the FCC’s recent Preemption Directive attempted, or even as broadly as the 2015 Open Internet
Order did, is unnecessary, counter-productive, and invasive of traditional state sovereignty in areas like health, safety, and consumer welfare.
The classification of broadband as an interstate service has
served to shore up the FCC’s claims to primacy (if not exclusivity) as
the national broadband policy maker, often to the detriment of state
and local communities, in both Republican and Democratic administrations. It has weakened state police power when it is needed most,
distorted the factual record on which policy is made, perpetuated illogically siloed oversight, and threatens to uncritically perpetuate this
paradigm into the future.
If the Mozilla court’s rejection of the Preemption Directive indeed left states with some level of sovereignty over de facto intrastate
broadband communications, arguing within the industry’s conceptual
framework seems not the best long-range strategy to assert and preserve public oversight of an essential public service. If a municipality
or other local entity wants to experiment, the principles of subsidiarity
suggest it should be able to do so. If a state wants to more robustly
protect its intrastate communications systems, a reasonable policy of
shared governance advises deference.
With a new administration in Washington, a new regime of
cooperative broadband federalism is possible. States can make a powerful argument for an equal seat at the table.

